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INTRODUCTION 
As the cost of health care in the United States continues to rise, 
consumer advocates and politicians push for more extreme and 
creative measures to keep prices down.  A significant factor in 
health care costs is the price of pharmaceuticals still under patent, 
so it is not surprising that this has become a particularly tempting 
target.  It has been widely reported that U.S. consumers pay more 
(in some cases significantly more) for patented pharmaceuticals1 
 
 1 In the debate over drug prices, advocates for greater access to affordable drugs 
generally exclude pharmaceuticals no longer under patent and those that can be obtained 
without a prescription because they tend to be more competitively priced due to the 
existence of either generic equivalents or acceptable alternatives.  In fact, it has been 
reported that U.S. generic and over-the-counter pharmaceutical prices are actually lower 
than most other industrialized countries. See Patricia Danzon & Michael Furukawa, 
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than consumers in other industrialized nations.2  If consumers in 
the U.S. could import pharmaceuticals purchased at lower foreign 
prices, advocates argue, the price savings could be enormous.3  
Representatives and supporters of the branded pharmaceutical 
companies counter that importation is merely a short-term solution 
that will harm medical innovation in the long run.4 
To date, legal, regulatory, and safety issues have prevented 
large-scale importation.  However, the groundswell of support for 
cheaper pharmaceuticals is slowly chipping away at the obstacles.  
 
Prices and Availability of Pharmaceuticals: Evidence from Nine Countries, HEALTH 
AFFAIRS, at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.521v1?ck=nck (Oct. 29, 
2003). 
 2 See, e.g., William Neikirk, Stakes Rise in Drug Import Fight, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 29, 
2004, at 10 (“Because Canada has a nationwide health system with price controls, 
prescription drugs sold north of the border are 30 percent to 80 percent cheaper than in 
the U.S., depending on the drug.”); Editorial, End Drug Import Hysteria, L.A. TIMES, 
Apr. 27, 2004, at B12 (“It’s no accident that Americans still pay 38% more for similar 
prescription drugs than Canadians, 45% more than the French and 48% more than 
Italians.”). 
 3 See, e.g., Examining the Implications of Drug Importation: Hearings Before the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Senator Charles 
Grassley) (“Legalizing the importation of prescription drugs through a highly regulated 
system overseen by FDA will stem the tide of unregulated pharmaceuticals coming into 
the U.S. and create a safe and effective system for obtaining low-cost prescription 
drugs.”). 
 4 See, e.g., Pharmaceutical Researchers and Manufacturers (“PhRMA”), Imports Carry 
Risks (Aug. 20, 2003) (“[F]oreign governments’ price controls . . . are drying up the 
discovery of new medicines in Europe.  America now leads the world in discovering new 
medicines.”), http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications/20.08.2003.832.cfm; U.S. 
Senate Repub. Pol’y Comm., Pharmaceutical Price Controls Abroad: An Unfair Trade 
Policy 6–7 (Nov. 6, 2003) (“Importation of pharmaceuticals only treats the symptom, not 
the cause—it may reduce drug prices temporarily, but it can lead to two devastating 
scenarios: first, it would be difficult to impossible for the United States to assure the 
safety and efficacy of the imported drugs; and second, indirectly imposing 
pharmaceutical price controls in the United States eventually will lead to reduced 
spending on R&D and fewer new drugs coming into the market.”), available at 
http://rpc.senate.gov/_files/hc110603.pdf; John E. Calfee, The High Price of Cheap 
Drugs, WKLY. STANDARD, July 21, 2003, at 20 (“[P]rice controls would end up 
suppressing innovation here, just as they have done abroad.  It is one thing for the 
Canadians and Europeans to free-ride on American R&D, but we can’t free-ride on 
ourselves.”).  The base of public support for this position appears significantly smaller 
than that for the importation advocates. See, e.g., Christopher Rowland, Thompson Shifts 
on Drug Imports, BOSTON GLOBE, May 5, 2004, at C1 (noting that pressure from a 
number of groups appeared to be eroding the Bush administration’s firm stance against 
importation). 
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Ire over drug prices, in combination with the recent political 
environment, suggests that low-priced, imported drugs may 
become an option in the near future.  Perhaps the most visible 
problem to be surmounted is the questionable safety of drugs 
purchased from foreign countries.5  Such problems are exacerbated 
when purchases are made by individual consumers, who, as a rule, 
have little ability to evaluate the quality of what they purchase.  An 
alternate importation method that may address these concerns has 
recently surfaced in the form of bulk purchases by government 
entities.  Several states and municipalities have requested approval 
from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to become, 
in essence, clearinghouses for local pharmaceutical sales.6  While 
this appears to largely solve the problem of unsafe drugs being 
imported into the U.S., and thus clears the way for mass 
importation, there remains another, more complex barrier: the 
threat of patent infringement lawsuits by branded pharmaceutical 
companies. 
What is the risk of infringement litigation for importation?  
Interestingly, it depends on the nature of the importer.  Some 
actors, like state governments, have limited immunity from such 
lawsuits, but utilizing alternative causes of action may circumvent 
this protection.  If significant state liability exists, could the federal 
government step in as a risk-free importer?  The rules are in flux, 
and the potential downsides are severe.  In view of the ambiguity, 
perhaps a wholesale change in the law is necessary to eliminate 
 
 5 Safety concerns are the primary reason the U.S. Food & Drug Administration 
opposes pharmaceutical importation. See Buyer Beware: The Danger of Purchasing 
Pharmaceuticals over the Internet: Hearings Before the Perm. Subcomm. on 
Investigations, Comm. on Gov’t Affairs, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Associate 
Commissioner for Regulatory Affairs, John M. Taylor III) (“FDA remains strongly 
concerned about unapproved, imported pharmaceuticals whose safety and effectiveness 
cannot be assured because they are outside the legal structure and regulatory resources 
provided by Congress.”), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/072204-
taylor2234.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2005). 
 6 See id.  The State of Vermont has now sued the FDA to compel the agency to permit 
state importation. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 7–8, State of 
Vermont v. Tommy G. Thompson (Aug. 19, 2004), available at 
http://www.atg.state.vt.us/upload/1092941916_Complaint_For_Declaratory_And_Injunct
ive_Relief.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2005); Pam Belluck, Vermont Will Sue U.S. for Right 
to Import Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2004, at A13. 
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any possibility of infringement liability.  Unfortunately, the extent 
to which such a revision would be both legally and economically 
viable is also uncertain. 
Why is there so much uncertainty regarding the treatment of 
such an established intellectual property right when the extensive 
jurisprudence surrounding tangible rights seems to produce much 
clearer results?  The basis appears to be a lingering resistance—in 
both the public psyche and the law—to accord full property rights 
to intellectual property.  While we support the recognition of 
property protections for intangibles on paper, at some level 
Americans are uncomfortable in granting intellectual property 
owners the complete range of powers given to tangible property 
owners, particularly in cases of social or political crisis.7  In other 
words, the fundamental respect for property over transitory 
legislative or judicial policy—full “propertization”—is struggling 
to emerge.8  To gauge the progress of the intellectual property 
rights equalization, it can be useful to consider extreme contexts 
that bring the most difficult issues to the forefront; the drug 
importation controversy more than meets this criteria. 
To date, there has been no comprehensive analysis of these 
relevant issues as they relate to pharmaceutical importation.  
Constitutional protections for intellectual property have been 
considered, but in broad brushes that do not address the issues 
 
 7  See, e.g., Daniel R. Cahoy, Treating the Legal Side Effects of Cipro®: A 
Reevaluation of Compensation Rules for Government Takings of Patent Rights, 40 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 125, 125–28 (2002) (describing the extreme public reaction to the fact that a 
foreign pharmaceutical company held exclusive patent rights to a medicine that was 
essential for the effective treatment of anthrax infection). 
 8 As this Article explains in detail, according legal protection to intellectual property 
that is similar to tangible property rights has important consequences.  But this is not an 
inevitable choice.  It could be argued that intellectual property rights should have a lower, 
weaker status due to their intangible nature. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Property, 
Intellectual Property and Free Riding, Stan. L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 291 (Aug. 
2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=582602 (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2005) (proposing that unauthorized use or “free riding” of intellectual 
property should be permitted in all but a few cases due to the irrationality of internalizing 
the associated positive externalities).  Deciding how much protection society should give 
to intellectual property is a fundamental public policy issue that is outside the scope of 
this article.  However, the analysis herein should help to contextualize the debate. 
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unique to this situation.9  Conversely, the specific context of 
importation and patents has been narrowly addressed, without the 
treatment of more expansive constitutional applications.10  In the 
meantime, state and municipal governments are beginning to 
implement importation proposals, while Congress has proposed 
several pieces of new legislation to facilitate imports.11  Thus, 
pharmaceutical importation represents a critical juncture in the 
 
 9 See, e.g., Richard H. Seamon, The Asymmetry of State Sovereign Immunity, 76 WASH 
L. REV. 1067, 1140–46 (2001) (discussing state sovereign immunity from takings claims 
in the context of patent cases); Daniel J. Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity: The Case of 
Federal Regulation of Intellectual Property, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1331, 1334–43 (2001) 
(assessing the remedies available for state infringement of intellectual property in view of 
Eleventh Amendment immunity); Mitchell N. Berman et al., State Accountability for 
Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How to “Fix” Florida Prepaid and How Not 
to, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1088–1101 (2001) (reviewing state liability for intellectual 
property infringement based on Fourteenth Amendment actions); Eugene Volokh, Essay, 
Sovereign Immunity and Intellectual Property, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1161, 1167–69 (2000) 
(considering the effect of eminent domain actions for government infringements of 
intellectual property); Christina Bohannan & Thomas F. Cotter, When States Steal Ideas: 
Is the Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity from Federal Infringement Claims 
Constitutional in Light of Seminole Tribe?,  67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1458–69 (1998) 
(arguing that Congress intended to preempt takings claims for intellectual property 
infringement); Thomas F. Cotter, Do Federal Uses of Intellectual Property Implicate the 
Fifth Amendment?, 50 FLA. L. REV. 529, 558–65 (1998) (considering the extent to which 
federal intellectual property infringements are compensable as a general takings claim); 
Shubha Ghosh, Reconciling Property Rights and States’ Rights in the Information Age: 
Federalism, the “Sovereign’s Prerogative” and Takings after College Savings, 31 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 17, 33–36 (1999) (discussing a potential constitutional route for pursuing 
intellectual property infringement actions against state governments). 
 10 See, e.g., Rebecca Eisenberg, Patents, Product Exclusivity, and Information 
Dissemination: How Law Directs Biopharmaceutical Research and Development, 72 
FORDHAM L. REV. 477, 485–86 (2003) (considering importation in the context of the 
FDA’s role in the dissemination of biotechnology and pharmaceutical innovation); Daniel 
Erlikhman, Jazz Photo and the Doctrine of Patent Exhaustion: Implications to TRIPs and 
International Harmonization of Patent Protection, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 307, 
323–31 (2003) (reviewing the law of the U.S., E.U. and Japan with respect to patent 
exhaustion); Shubha Ghosh, Pills, Patents & Power: State Creation of Gray Markets as a 
Limit on Patent Rights, 53 FLA. L. REV. 789, 820–23 (2001) (discussing international 
patent exhaustion in the context of essential medicines); Bryan Baer, Price Controls 
through the Back Door: The Parallel Importation of Pharmaceuticals, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. 
L. 109, 113–20 (2001) (discussing United States patent exhaustion in the context of 
pharmaceuticals, but with an analysis of U.S. doctrine that predates the most significant 
case law). See generally Darren Donnelly, Parallel Trade and International 
Harmonization of Rights Doctrine, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 445 
(1997) (providing a useful outline of the exhaustion doctrines of Europe and Japan). 
 11 See infra Parts III.B, V.A, respectively. 
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continued evolution of intellectual property rights, and this 
necessitates a thorough assessment of the issue. 
This Article will consider the legal implications of 
pharmaceutical importation, focusing primarily on state and federal 
liability as a context for the reemergence of constitutional 
protections in intellectual property law.  Part I discusses the social 
and political background for the conflict between patent property 
rights and essential medical care.  Part II describes the social 
policy-based initiatives that would have a significant impact on 
established patent rights.  Next, Part III investigates the avenues of 
recourse available for property owners, with a special focus on the 
power of novel approaches that are grounded in basic 
constitutional rights.  The inability of the legislature to circumvent 
constitutional rights is described in Part IV, with a brief note on the 
special exception available to the courts.  Finally, the Article 
provides conclusions regarding the likely impact of this dispute on 
the future of intellectual property protection. 
I. HIGH PHARMACEUTICAL PRICES AS A FUNCTION OF THE 
COMPLEX LEGAL, REGULATORY, AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
The last thirty years of drug discovery have, without question, 
produced a multitude of important pharmaceutical treatments that 
have increased the quality of life for millions of people; indeed, 
many lives have literally been extended through innovative 
pharmacology.12 Additionally, drug development has resulted in 
lifestyle improvements in areas fundamental to self image and 
worth.13  It can even be argued that drug discovery saves health 
care dollars as it may reduce the use of more expensive care 
 
 12 The impressive record of the pharmaceutical industry is touted by PhRMA, its 
primary lobbying group. See generally PHRMA, THE VALUE OF MEDICINES (2001), 
available at http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications/value2001/value2001.pdf.  
Regardless of one’s position on the economics and ethics of the industry, the benefits the 
world has received from drug discovery in the last twenty years are hard to discount. 
 13 See, e.g., Tim Atkinson, Lifestyle Drug Market Booming, 8 NATURE MED. 909, 909 
(2002) (stating that the market for lifestyle drugs is projected to rise to $29 billion by 
2007). 
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options, such as hospital stays.14  These fruits come at the price of 
billions of dollars in research and development spending on the 
part of pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, as well as 
the government.15  Such expenditures are made with the 
expectation that they can eventually be recouped.  The primary 
mechanism by which the profits from those successful drugs can 
be maximized is access limitation through patent rights.16  Thus, 
patents and pharmaceutical prices are intimately intertwined, and it 
is hard to affect one without impacting the other. 
A. The Interaction of Patents and Regulation 
In the United States, all patents, including those covering 
pharmaceutical products, are recognized as personal property 
rights17 granted for inventions that meet three primary 
 
 14 See, e.g., Frank Lichtenberg, Do (More and Better) Drugs Keep People out of 
Hospitals?, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 384, 388 (1996) (concluding that an increase in 100 
prescriptions is associated with 16.3 fewer hospital days, and a $1 increase in 
pharmaceutical expenditure is associated with a $3.65 reduction in hospital costs and a 
$1.54 increase in ambulatory care). 
 15 See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (“OECD”), 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE IN INDUSTRY: 1987–2001, 32–33 (2003) 
(noting that pharmaceutical companies in the United States spent almost $13 billion on 
research and development in 2000). 
 16 See id. at 20 (“Patents play a critical role for both the level of R&D investment in 
pharmaceuticals and the timing of generic competition.”); U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 
INT’L TRADE ADMIN, PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE CONTROLS IN OECD COUNTRIES: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. CONSUMERS, PRICING, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND 
INNOVATION xi (2004) [hereinafter ITA REPORT] (“In short, intellectual property 
protection is a necessary prerequisite to ensure that innovative companies can continue to 
develop new drugs, which will eventually be available on the generic market.”).  
Certainly there are other ways a pharmaceutical manufacturer can obtain a competitive 
advantage, such as manufacturing skill or the acquisition of initial market share, but 
patents are critical in the pharmaceutical industry. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TO 
PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND 
POLICY ch. 3, at 9–10 (2003) (“Participants in the Hearings overwhelmingly expressed 
the view that patent rights for pharmaceuticals are essential for brand-name companies to 
prevent free riding and recoup their significant investments in research and development 
of [new chemical entities].”), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10-
/innovationrpt.pdf. 
 17 See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000) (“Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have 
the attributes of personal property.”). 
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requirements: novelty, nonobviousness, and utility.18  They issue 
only after an inventor has convinced the United States Patent & 
Trademark Office (“USPTO”) that these three requirements have 
been met.19  Subsequently, the issued patents are in force for a term 
that expires twenty years after the original filing date.20  During 
that time period, the patent owner has the right to exclude all 
others from making, using, selling, offering to sell or importing the 
inventions into the United States.21 
The right to exclude is particularly significant if it covers an 
invention that is in great demand, such as an important medical 
treatment.  The patent owner can use the property right to create a 
legal scarcity22 and charge higher prices than one could normally 
 
 18 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2000).  Actually, the utility requirement applies to only 
one type of patent, the aptly named “utility patent.”  One can also obtain a plant patent, 
see 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2000), and design patents, see 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2000), but due to 
their respective limitations, they are not widely used in the pharmaceutical industry to 
protect innovation. 
 19 See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2002). 
 20 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2002).  In 1995, the GATT amendments to the Patent Act 
changed the method of calculating patent term from seventeen years from issuance of the 
patent to twenty years from filing of the patent application. Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 
F.3d 1543, 1546–47 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  Owners who held patents still in force as of 1995 
were given a choice of electing whichever calculation method would give the longest 
patent term. Id. at 1547 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1) (1994)). 
 21 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2003); Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1578 
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The act of invention itself vests an inventor with a common law or 
‘natural’ right to make, use and sell his or her invention absent conflicting patent rights in 
others . . . .”).  A patent conveys the additional right to exclude others from making, 
using, selling or offering to sell the invention. Id. (citing Six Wheel Corp. v. Sterling 
Motor Truck Co., 50 F.2d 568, 571 (9th Cir. 1931)). 
 22 Intellectual property is not actually scarce in an economic sense, but only in a legal 
sense, since it is inherently non–rivalrous—one’s use does not diminish the property 
available for another’s use. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 
120 (4th ed. 2004) (1988); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 43 (5th ed. 
1998) (1973).  However, resources associated with intellectual property may be scarce, 
benefiting from efficient allocation. See Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the 
Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 275–80 (1977) (“[T]he property rights literature has 
viewed the central problem as one of scarcity, while information has appeared to be an 
example of something that can be used without limit.  There is, however, a scarcity of 
resources that may be employed to use information, and it is that scarcity which generates 
the need for a system of property rights in information.”) 
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obtain in a perfectly competitive market.23  Some refer to this as 
monopoly pricing,24 but market dynamics rarely allow a patent 
owner to literally obtain monopoly control of a market.25  
Importantly, a patent may cover more than one aspect of a product.  
Pharmaceuticals, for example, may be covered by patents on the 
basic chemical compound, methods of making the compound, 
methods of formulating the compound for effective treatment, and 
methods of administering the compound in the treatment of a 
disease—in some cases all four aspects may be embodied by a 
single product.26  Later-filed patents on ancillary aspects of a 
product may have the effect of nominally extending core patents, 
assuming they continue to prevent competitors from making the 
product.27  Because all of the relevant patents will expire 
eventually, these protections give the patent owner a limited 
amount of time to recoup research and development expenditures. 
The pharmaceutical regulatory regime in the United States adds 
a layer of complexity to the intellectual property scheme in an 
 
 23 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 22, at 122 (“[A] patent enables the inventor of 
something valuable to earn profits that exceed the ordinary rate of return on 
investment.”). 
 24 See id. 
 25 See Edmund Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of 
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1729–38 (2000) (“Whether or not any 
patent or other intellectual property right confers an economic monopoly is an empirical 
question, but it seems likely that all trademarks, almost all copyrights, and most patents 
are not monopolies.”). 
 26 For example, a search of the FDA’s on-line record of drug application approvals (the 
“electronic orange book”) for the anti-cholesterol drug Lipitor (application no. 020702) 
shows that it is covered by ten different patents. See FDA, Electronic Orange Book, at 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/default.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).  But note, this is not 
the same as obtaining multiple patents on the same invention; rather the product 
encompasses multiple inventions.  Technically, each patent claim is, under the law, a 
separate invention. See Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1984).  
Interestingly, some widely-known drug treatments actually have patents only on the most 
effective method of using the compound, rather than the compound itself. See General 
Accounting Office, NIH-Private Sector Partnership in the Development of Taxol, GAO-
03-829, 24 (June 2003) (noting that, although the active ingredient of the blockbuster 
anti-cancer drug, Taxol (paclitaxel), has not been patented, methods of administration of 
the drug have been patented), at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03829.pdf.  The 
compound may be otherwise freely available. 
 27 See Mark Lemley & Kimberly Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 
B.U. L. REV. 63, 81–83 (2004) (describing the process of obtaining multiple patents on 
the same pharmaceutical product as “evergreening”). 
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attempt to balance the interests of patent owners against the 
public’s interest in obtaining generic versions of patented drugs as 
soon as possible.28  This effectively results in additional pressure 
on branded pharmaceutical companies to quickly obtain maximum 
profits.  The FDA, the primary regulatory agency that oversees 
pharmaceuticals, must approve all new drug applications 
(“NDAs”) for marketing in the United States.29  Such applications 
require the submission of, inter alia, clinical data sufficient to 
show that the drug is “safe and effective” for its intended use.30  
Prior to the 1980s, an innovator pharmaceutical company (i.e., the 
company that invents a new, often patentable, drug or treatment) 
could count on some delay in the filing of competitor (generic) 
NDAs following the expiration of the innovator’s patent rights.  
This is because generating clinical data takes time,31 and the 
process could not be started until the expiration of the patent, as it 
would likely involve an infringing “use” of the patented drug or 
treatment.32  All of that changed with the passage of the Hatch-
 
 28 See Holly Soehnge, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 
1984: Fine-Tuning the Balance Between the Interests of Pioneer and Generic Drug 
Manufacturers, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 51, 51 (2003).  For an excellent overview of the 
background behind the enactment of the most important piece of legislation, see 
generally Gerald Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the 
Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187 (1999). 
 29 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2003).  Technically the requirement is for marketing in interstate 
commerce, but few if any drugs would fail to meet that threshold. See also DONALD 
BEERS, GENERIC AND INNOVATOR DRUGS: A GUIDE TO FDA APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS § 
1.01 (1999). 
 30 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A) (2003). 
 31 See Soehnge, supra note 28, at 53–54; Mossinghoff, supra note 28, at 187.  Although 
an “experimental use” exception does exist in patent law, it is very rarely applied. See, 
e.g., Embrex, Inc. v. Service Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“This 
court has construed both the experimental use and de minimis exceptions very 
narrowly.”).  Moreover, the courts have determined conclusively that this common law-
derived exception does not apply in the case of a competing pharmaceutical company 
preparing data for submission to the FDA. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 
F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984) (holding that use of patented 
ingredient to perform tests necessary for a competitor to obtain approval of the FDA was 
an infringement). 
 32 See Roche, 733 F.2d 858.  Although an “experimental use” exception does exist in 
patent law, it is very rarely applied. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361–62 
(Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).  In particular, the courts have 
determined conclusively that this common law-derived exception does not apply in the 
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Waxman Act in 1984.33  The new law created a statutory 
“experimental use” exception that permitted a generic competitor 
to use a patented drug or treatment for the creation of data for 
submission to a federal regulatory agency during the term of the 
patent, though marketing approval would still be delayed until the 
patent expired.34  The Act also streamlined the application process 
for generic pharmaceutical applicants by allowing them to file an 
abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”), which requires only 
that an applicant demonstrate the subject drug to be 
“bioequivalent” to an existing NDA, as opposed to the more 
stringent “safe and effective” standard.35  Additionally, generic 
companies were given the ability to challenge all listed patents 
before marketing a product by virtue of the Act’s declaration that 
the submission of an ANDA constitutes a technical infringement, 
thus satisfying the “case and controversy” requirement of the U.S. 
courts.36  Taken together, these measures ensure that patent rights 
for a valuable pharmaceutical will be strictly limited.37 
By possessing a patent’s exclusive rights, pharmaceutical 
companies have the ability to take full advantage of the value that 
the market places on the drug or treatment in question.38  And 
when a broadly-applicable, lifesaving medication is under this 
 
case of a competing pharmaceutical company preparing data for submission to the FDA. 
See Roche, 733 F.2d at 863. 
 33 Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 
Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2003)). 
 34 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2003). 
 35 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(2–3), (c)(3), (j) (2003); BEERS, supra note 29, at § 3.03[A][4]. 
 36 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2003); BEERS, supra note 29, at § 3.03[B][3]; 
Mossinghoff, supra note 28, at 190 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)). 
 37 Concerns that patent owners had discovered techniques to game the Hatch-Waxman 
provisions led to recent revisions in the law that close a number of loopholes. See 
Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 
Stat. 2066, 2448–53 (2003) [hereinafter “Medicare Act”] (restricting an NDA holder’s 
ability to prevent ANDA approval through strategic listing of multiple patents).  
Although these changes were vigorously challenged by the pharmaceutical industry, the 
effect is likely to be quite minor. 
 38 Although new drugs covered by patents are not necessarily more expensive than 
existing treatments, launch prices do tend be higher when new classes of compounds are 
introduced. See Joseph A. DiMasi, Price Trends for Prescription Pharmaceuticals: 
1995–1999, at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/Drug-papers/dimassi/dimasi-final.htm 
(last updated Oct. 11, 2000). 
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control, consumers are willing to pay a high price.39  While some 
may see it as gouging,40 others accept that innovator 
pharmaceutical companies must fund risky research programs with 
the few commercial successes they achieve.41  A widely cited 
estimate from the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development 
suggests that each new pharmaceutical has over $800 million in 
research and development failure costs to recoup before it is 
technically profitable.42  The ability to set the highest price the 
market will bear is an incentive that all research-based drug 
companies likely use to craft their drug discovery programs. 
The price pressures in the U.S. that are created by endogenous 
forces would be significant enough, but the national 
pharmaceutical market does not exist in a vacuum.  There is no 
doubt that the economics of the system are greatly exacerbated by 
the influence of foreign health care regimes.  In fact, the global 
market has been a significant factor in pushing the cost of 
American health care to the crisis point. 
 
 
 39 See John Carey & Amy Barrett, Drug Prices: What’s Fair?, BUS. WK., Dec. 10, 
2001, at 60 (“The nation’s drug bill has been rising at 14% to 18% a year, and for 2001 it 
will be between $160 billion and $170 billion, according to private sector estimates.”). 
 40 See FAMILIES USA, OFF THE CHARTS: PAY, PROFITS AND SPENDING BY DRUG 
COMPANIES 10 (2001) (“[I]f meaningful steps are taken to ameliorate fast-growing drug 
prices and costs, it is corporate profits; expenditures on marketing, advertising, and 
administration; and executive compensation that are more likely to be affected, not R&D 
spending.”), available at http://www.familiesusa.org/site/DocServer/drugceos.pdf?-
docID=767 (last visited Jan. 12, 2005).  This perception is especially common when the 
profits from the sale of the pharmaceutical significantly outstrip the cost of producing and 
marketing it. 
 41 See Henry Grabowski, Politics, Policy and Availability: Patent and New Product 
Development in the Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industry, 8 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 
7, 9 (2003) (“One of the reasons why R&D is so costly in pharmaceuticals is that most 
new drug candidates fail to reach the market.”); PHRMA, WHY DO PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 
COST SO MUCH . . . AND OTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR MEDICINE 8–9 (2000), available at 
http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications/brochure/questions/questions.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2005). 
 42 See Joseph DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug 
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 166–68, 180 (2003) (reporting that the 
research conducted under the Tufts Center for Drug Development found that research and 
development costs are $802 million, and nearly $900 million if post approval research 
and development is taken into account). 
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B. Differences in International Pharmaceutical Prices Ratchet Up 
the Pressure on American Consumers 
The patent system’s pressure to obtain monopoly profits for as 
long as possible is not unique to the United States; most nations 
have a strikingly similar property right incentive system by virtue 
of international agreements like the Paris Convention43 and 
TRIPs.44  If intellectual property protection was the only factor in 
the cost of drugs, prices might still be high in the U.S., but the 
burden would likely be spread out a bit more throughout the world 
and the veneer of inequity that currently sullies the industry might 
not exist.45  However, studies have demonstrated that 
pharmaceutical prices in most other industrialized nations are often 
significantly less than in the United States, depending on the 
drug.46  The reason for this price difference despite the similarity in 
 
 43 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last 
revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris 
Convention]. 
 44 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994 , 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter 
TRIPS Agreement]. 
 45 A recent International Trade Administration study of international pharmaceutical 
price controls found that minor differences in intellectual property rights among the 
nations studied did not have a significant affect on pricing. See ITA REPORT, supra note 
16, at ix. 
 46 See AUSTL’N PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE 
DIFFERENCES xxiii–xxvii (July 2001) (charts demonstrating that U.S. prices for all 
categories of pharmaceuticals—innovative, “me too” and generic—and innovative 
pharmaceuticals specifically, are significantly higher than in Canada, the UK, Sweden, 
France, Spain, Australia and New Zealand), available at http://www.pc.gov.au/study-
/pbsprices/finalreport; HOUSE MINORITY STAFF REPORT, COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM AND 
OVERSIGHT, PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICING IN VERMONT: AN INTERNATIONAL PRICE 
COMPARISON (Nov. 1, 1998) (finding that the average prices that senior citizens in 
Vermont must pay for the ten brand name prescription drugs that have the highest dollar 
sales to the elderly in the United States are 81% higher than the average prices that 
Canadian consumers must pay and 112% higher than the average prices that Mexican 
consumers must pay), available at http://bernie.house.gov/prescriptions/international.asp; 
Danzon & Furukawa, supra note 1, exh. 4 (chart demonstrating that the pharmaceutical 
prices for on-patent brand name drugs in many other industrialized nations are 
significantly less than in the United States); ITA REPORT, supra note 16, at 11–15 (stating 
that prices for particular patented drugs in nine OECD countries were only 33–59% of the 
U.S. price, based on standard units). 
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intellectual property protections involves a rather complex set of 
factors. 
First and foremost, the health care systems of most 
industrialized nations are quite different from the United States.  In 
general, most countries have some sort of nationalized health care 
program.47  These programs entail deep government intervention in 
all aspects of providing health care services, including staffing 
facilities, determining the available level of care, and purchasing 
medical supplies like pharmaceuticals.48  This level of involvement 
makes government entities powerful negotiators, and in the case of 
drugs, has allowed them to set maximum prices.49  Many countries 
do this through a system of reimbursement for patient purchases of 
drugs, in which a given amount is provided through a national 
insurance supplement.50  Often, the reimbursement amount is 
linked to a class of drugs rather than each individual treatment, in a 
practice known as “reference pricing.”51  Patients are permitted to 
pay more, but there is obviously a strong disincentive to choose a 
drug that is priced above others in the class (and conversely, a 
 
 47 See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (“WHO”), WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2000 95–96 
(2000), at http://www.who.int/whr2001/2001/archives/2000/en/contents.htm (“Most high 
income countries rely heavily on either general taxation or mandated social health 
insurance contributions [to finance health care]”). 
 48 See AUSTL’N PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, supra note 46, at 17–21 (“Most developed 
countries are similar to Australia in that governments, for social welfare and equity 
reasons, subsidize the consumption of prescription pharmaceuticals that have been 
approved for marketing by regulatory authorities.”). 
 49 See id. at 21–25; ITA REPORT, supra note 16, at 3 (“All OECD governments studied 
in this report rely on some form of price controls to manage spending on 
pharmaceuticals.”). 
 50 See AUSTL’N PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, supra note 46, at 22 (“[M]ost OECD countries 
have moved away from [direct price] controls in favor of reimbursement pricing systems.  
Under reimbursement pricing systems, public or private pharmaceutical insurers set price 
ceilings for subsidized items (where the list of subsidized items is commonly referred to 
as a formulary).  Insurers agree to cover or reimburse the cost of listed pharmaceuticals 
up to the ceiling (reimbursement price).  Manufacturers are free to price above the 
reimbursement price but the patient usually must pay the difference between the 
reimbursement price and the manufacturer’s price.”). 
 51 See id. at 25–26 (“Under a reference pricing system, reimbursement prices are 
commonly set for a group or cluster of similar or identical pharmaceuticals. . . . If the 
reference price is set at the level of the lowest-priced item in the group, manufacturers of 
the higher priced items may be required to lower their price to the benchmark.”); ITA 
REPORT, supra note 16, at 4 (describing the practice and noting that many countries 
consider it to be less restrictive than outright price controls). 
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strong incentive for pharmaceutical companies to price drugs at the 
level at which they will be reimbursed).52  Drug classification and 
reimbursement may be determined, in part, by an economic 
analysis of the treatment regimen that links the appropriate drug 
cost to its benefits in view of existing treatments.53  While this 
pricing method could be termed an indirect form of price control, 
some governments go further and actually set by law the maximum 
price for which a drug or class of drugs may be sold.54  Whether 
pricing is set by direct control or reimbursement, a great number of 
countries add another powerful factor that elevates this process to 
an international level.  Instead of setting controls or negotiating in 
an isolated context, they use international benchmarking (or 
“external reference pricing”), which looks to the prices in certain 
countries as an objective measure of reasonableness.55  Often, the 
reference formula states that a pharmaceutical’s price must match 
the lowest price among several reference nations.56  Taken 
together, these techniques along with a few other sporadically used 
controls on pricing57 provide a powerful force to keep prices down, 
and by all estimates they have been quite effective.58 
 
 52 See AUSTL’N PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, supra note 46, at 26. 
 53 See id. at 22–24.  In contrast, doctors in the United States are generally permitted to 
prescribe drugs “off label” if they believe effective treatment will be provided. See James 
M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking 
Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 76 (1998) (“[P]hysicians may use 
legally marketed drugs or devices in any way that they believe, in their professional 
judgment, will best serve their patients.”).  Insurance coverage is often still available. See 
id. at 76–77. 
 54 See AUSTL’N PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, supra note 46, at 29.  Perhaps the most 
relevant example of a direct price control system is Canada’s.  The Canadian 
government, through the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board (“PMPRB”), sets the 
maximum price at which patented medicines may be sold to ensure that they are “not 
excessive.” See PMPRB, COMPENDIUM OF GUIDELINE, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 4–6 
(Oct. 2003), at http://www.pmprb-cepmb.gc.ca/CMFiles/2004compendium-e21LTW-
152004-1350.pdf. 
 55 See AUSTL’N PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, supra note 46, at 29; Patricia Danzon & 
Adrian Towse, Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals: Reconciling Access, R&D and 
Patents, 3 INT’L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. & ECON. 183, 191 (2003) (“[E]xternal referencing 
is used formally by the Netherlands, Canada, Greece and Italy, among others, and used 
informally by many other countries.  External referencing is equivalent to fully importing 
a foreign price.”). 
 56 See AUSTL’N PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, supra note 46, at 29. 
 57 Other methods of influencing drug prices include setting a volume limit on a 
particular price (following which the price must be reduced) and limitations on the 
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An additional factor in pricing is the variation within the 
market for pharmaceuticals in different countries.  Some drugs that 
are in high demand in the United States may not be the preferred 
form of treatment in other countries due to physician preferences 
or differences in marketing practices.59  As a consequence of 
simple supply/demand microeconomics, prices for a specific drug 
could be lower in countries with less demand. 
Finally, there is the simple difference in the ability of health 
care systems and individual patients in various countries to pay for 
high-priced drugs.  Pharmaceutical companies may take into 
account the fact that a certain country—for example, an African 
state—has a great need for a drug, but insufficient economic health 
to support either government or private purchase in substantial 
quantities.60  In such cases, the company may dispense the drug for 
little or no profit above cost.  Income-related incentives to reduce 
prices are likely present in many countries, but the influence of 
other factors means that drug prices do not always correlate 
perfectly with a nation’s per capita income level.61 
The aforementioned pressures on drug prices lead to essentially 
two options for research-intensive pharmaceutical companies: (1) 
accept lower profits overall or (2) attempt to make up the 
difference in a market that does not have the above constraints.  
The latter choice seems obvious given the basic industry model.  
 
amount of profit a company may make on sales to a country’s health service per product 
or during a particular time period. See ITA REPORT, supra note 16, at 5–6. 
 58 AUSTL’N PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, supra note 46, at 77–78 (concluding that cost 
containment mechanisms are an important factor in international price differences, but 
that it is difficult to correlate the particular mechanism to the amount of cost 
containment). 
 59 See Danzon & Furukawa, supra note 1, exh. 7.  A very important difference is the 
prohibition on “direct-to-consumer” advertising in many countries. See Geoff Dyer, 
Europe Seeks to Calm Nerves over US-Style Drug Advertising, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2002, 
at 20 (“Ironically, while Europe is moving towards restricting information from 
companies, the FDA is considering further relaxation after a number of recent cases 
found it was violating freedom of speech.”). 
 60 See Gautam Naik, Glaxo to Cut Price of AIDS Drug Used in Africa, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 28, 2003, at B3. 
 61 See Danzon & Towse, supra note 55, at 191–92 (stating that factors such as a 
country’s negotiating power may preclude a prefect correlation between per capita 
income level and pharmaceutical pricing, because higher prices are often found in poorer 
countries). 
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The continued vitality of a pharmaceutical company is intimately 
tied to its investment in future pharmaceutical innovations because 
health care products can face a potentially more truncated lifespan 
than other products.  In fact, pharmaceutical companies are often 
measured as much by their “pipeline” of future drugs as their 
current portfolio.62  The lifespan of a drug product is dictated by 
the practice of modern medicine, which generally attempts to 
incorporate the newest, most effective (and almost always 
patented) treatments.  Existing treatment regimens will experience 
a loss in market share and may even disappear when objectively 
better treatments become available.63  Being forced to use a 
product that is “second best” on the market is, to some degree, 
immoral, so products do not usually remain available on the basis 
of a price break from the premium product.64  The pharmaceutical 
industry responds to this pressure with aggressive, expensive 
research to find the next blockbuster treatment.65  Thus, 
pharmaceutical companies have generally undertaken a policy of 
maximizing profits in the last free-market health care realm: the 
United States.66 
 
 62 See, e.g., John Simons, Lilly Goes off Prozac, FORTUNE, Jun. 28, 2004, at 179 (“Lilly 
is a bright spot in Big Pharma, widely acknowledged to have the industry’s most 
bountiful pipeline of new products.”). 
 63 An excellent example is provided by the market for gastrointestinal medications 
(e.g., heartburn and acid reflux drugs).  From the 1970s to the 1990s, acid suppression 
medications (H2 receptor antagonists) such as Zantac and Tagamet dominated the 
market, but sales were dramatically driven down when more effective proton pump 
inhibitor drugs like Prilosec were approved. See Cindy Parks Thomas & Grant Ritter, 
Drug Utilization Trends by Therapeutic Class (Aug. 31, 2000), available at 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/Drug-papers/index.htm. 
 64 Note that we have a belief in American society that denial of treatment based on lack 
funds is immoral.  Unlike most countries that long ago accepted monetary limitations on 
their health care systems, the U.S. continues to try to make everything available to 
everyone.  Perhaps this is inherently unsustainable.  It is, however, a topic for a different 
paper. 
 65 See Robert Franco, Beyond the Blockbuster, PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE, Nov. 
2002, at 74 (noting the blockbuster model tends to dictate the strategy of Big Pharma, but 
suggesting that a more moderate approach that aims toward slightly less successful drugs 
could be more profitable across the board), available at http://www.pharmexec.com-
/pharmexec/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=36729&&pageID=2. 
 66 One could argue that prices in the United States actually reflect the free market price 
rather than an attempt to obtain high profits to offset lower profits in other countries. See 
ITA REPORT, supra note 16, at 10 (“U.S. prices are undeniably more market-oriented and 
suffer from less direct government intervention than is true among its trading 
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As a result of the forces acting on drug prices, the chasm 
between U.S. prices and those in foreign industrialized nations is 
likely to increase each year, particularly in the case of essential 
medicines.  Prices for these select drugs seem to continuously 
spiral upward with no sign of abatement.  It has become 
abundantly clear that American consumers are no longer content to 
bear the majority of financing for pharmaceutical research that 
benefits the entire international community.  Assuming that the 
United States would have little success in convincing other 
countries to change their systems in order to pay for a greater share 
of the research burden, the only option is to try to control prices in 
this country.  There are a number of possible avenues for achieving 
this goal, but for various reasons, none have been successful in 
lowering prices for most Americans. 
II. IMPORTATION INITIATIVES AS A POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE 
FORM OF PRICE CONTROL 
The most direct way of controlling drug costs in the United 
States is for the federal government to create and enforce a 
national schedule of maximum prices.  Legally mandated price 
caps already occur to a limited extent with drugs purchased by 
federal programs like Medicaid and the Veteran’s 
Administration.67  However, as a general matter, a national price 
control initiative that would affect private transactions is a rare 
 
partners. . . . U.S. prices [offer] the closest approximation of deregulated prices . . .”).  
This notion requires one to accept that pharmaceutical companies will always price to 
maximize profits when possible.  However, because non-price factors such as political 
concerns and public relations are undoubtedly figured in, companies do retain some 
flexibility in determining the sales price.  Thus, it is not unreasonable to presume that 
pharmaceutical manufacturers have raised prices above that which they would normally 
charge in reaction to the pressures from countries with price controls. 
 67 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4401, 104 
Stat. 1388, 1388–143 (1990).  The law requires drug manufacturers to provide a rebate 
based on the average manufacturer price. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 
Medicaid Drug Rebate Program, at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/drugs-
/drughmpg.asp? (last modified Sep. 16, 2004).  The rebate equals the difference between 
the drug manufacturer’s average wholesale price and the best price it offers to other 
buyers (other than the federal government), or at least 15.1%. Id. 
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event in recent U.S. history,68 one that is politically dangerous to 
undertake as it represents the antithesis of a free market,69 and 
difficult for a centralized government to set and apply effectively.70  
Another price containment method would be to use the purchasing 
power of the federal government’s Medicare program (which has a 
greater impact than the Medicaid program)71 as a negotiating 
sword.  This was actually proposed during the last round of 
Medicare reforms, but it was ultimately rejected (with specific 
language in the Public Law actually prohibiting the federal 
government from taking such actions72).73  Private insurance 
companies may also have some ability to negotiate pharmaceutical 
prices to reduce consumer costs; however, most have chosen 
 
 68 See Hugh Rockoff, Price Controls, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, 
Library of Economics and Liberty, available at http://www.econlib.org/library-
/Enc/PriceControls.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2005).  The exception has been in times of 
war. Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 See W. David Slawson, Price Controls for a Peacetime Economy, 84 HARV. L. REV. 
1090, 1092 (1971): 
An efficient price-control system would reduce inflation but would not: (1) 
require a very large bureaucracy, (2) impose heavy compliance costs upon 
industry, (3) set prices which would missallocate [sic] resources more than 
would the economy in its absence, or (4) set prices so low as materially to 
reduce incentives for hard work, innovation, or investment.  These are the 
characteristic evils of price controls.  Price control systems in the past have 
exhibited each of these shortcomings, and critics have claimed that they are 
inescapable byproducts of any comprehensive scheme of price regulation. 
 71 The Medicare and Medicaid programs have similar numbers of people enrolled—
each about 40 million. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 2004 CMS 
STATISTICS 3 (2004), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/researchers/pubs/CMS-
statistics/2004CMSstat.pdf.  However, many of Medicaid’s recipients are children and 
young adults, who consume only a small percentage of the nation’s prescription drugs. 
See HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., A PROFILE OF MEDICAID: CHARTBOOK 2000 12 (2000), at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/charts/medicaid/2Tchartbk.pdf. 
 72 See Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act of 2003 (“MMA”), Pub. L. 
No. 108-173, § 1860D-11(i), 117 Stat. 2066, 2098 (2003): 
Noninterference.—In order to promote competition under this part and in 
carrying out this part, the Secretary— 
(1) may not interfere with the negotiations between drug manufacturers and  
pharmacies and PDP sponsors; and 
(2) may not require a particular formulary or institute a price structure [line 
up]for the reimbursement of covered part D drugs. 
 73 See Medicare Prescription Drug Price Negotiation Act, H.R. 3299, 108th Cong. (Oct. 
2003). 
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instead to decrease the percentage of prescription drug prices that 
are covered for their policy holders (or eliminate prescription plans 
altogether).74 
The current lack of success in controlling the prices offered in 
this country has naturally led to the popular consideration of 
directly tapping into discounted foreign prices.  While this solution 
would, on its face, seem to be as simple as purchasing drugs 
abroad and importing75 them into the United States, it has quickly 
become apparent that many barriers exist.76 
A. Federal Regulatory Barriers Currently Prohibit 
Pharmaceutical Importation 
The federal agency charged with ensuring the safety of the 
nation’s drug supply, the Department of Health and Human 
Service (“HHS”), which oversees the FDA, has a considerable 
interest in the drug import debate.  Understandably, there is 
concern when a stream of foreign pharmaceuticals enters into the 
United States with less FDA scrutiny than drugs intentionally 
produced for the domestic market.  Here, HHS’ mandate regarding 
safe and effective treatments is applied to both foreign-made or 
 
 74 See Vanessa Fuhrmans, Higher Co-Pays May Take Toll on Health, WALL ST. J., May 
19, 2004, at D1. 
 75 When pharmaceuticals are exported from the United States for sale overseas and then 
imported back, the practice is technically referred to as “reimportation.”  If done without 
the permission of the authorized U.S. dealer, the practice is referred to as “parallel 
importation.”  This Article will not distinguish between these terms, and will use 
“importation” as a general term for all three varieties. 
 76 Importation works only as long as there are drugs to import.  It has been noted, for 
example, that if drug imports were immediately permitted across the board, the 
international market could supply no more than 10–15% of the U.S. drug market. See 
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, WOULD PRESCRIPTION DRUG IMPORTATION REDUCE U.S. DRUG 
SPENDING? 4 (2004) (“Potential savings in the United States would depend on import 
volume, which reflects the size of the total drug market in source countries.  CBO 
estimates that the volume of world supply outside the United States is about twice the 
size of the U.S. market.  Assuming that volume slippage from outside the United States 
would resemble that from source countries within Europe, CBO estimates that the import 
volume would be in the range of about 10 percent to 15 percent of the U.S. market.”).  
Additionally, pharmaceutical companies have the ability to cut foreign exports of certain 
drugs to ensure that countries have no more drugs than necessary to satisfy their own 
markets (i.e., not enough to export). 
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purchased drugs as well as those produced domestically.77  Also, 
no matter what HHS rules specifically address importing drugs, the 
FDA still has the power to regulate any marketing activity for 
drugs in the U.S.78 
Interestingly, the specific question of importing drugs—though 
it has garnered the reputation as a recent political issue—has been 
debated for some time and addressed to varying degrees in several 
legislative undertakings.  For example, the safety of imported 
pharmaceuticals was a cause for concern as early as the 19th 
century, when public pressure regarding impure or adulterated 
medicines compelled Congress to pass the Import Drug Act of 
1848.79  This law created a system at important U.S. ports for 
inspecting medicines for “quality, purity, and fitness for medical 
purposes,” as well as to “their value and corresponding identity 
called for on the invoice.”80  Although initially under the 
jurisdiction of U.S. Customs, the responsibility for scrutinizing 
imports eventually was allocated to the FDA where it resides 
today.81 
More recently, a resurgence of safety concerns in the 1980s 
resulted in the passage of the Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 
1987 (“PDMA”).82  The PDMA is directed to several aspects of 
prescription pharmaceutical safety and was a response to 
widespread fear over counterfeit or adulterated pharmaceuticals 
appearing on the market from foreign countries.83  The most 
 
 77 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2003). 
 78 See BEERS, supra note 29, § 1.01 (noting that the FDA must approve the marketing 
of any “new drug” in interstate commerce); Div. of Imp. Operations & Policy, Food & 
Drug Admin., Information on Importation of Drugs, at http://www.fda.gov/ora/import-
/pipinfo.htm (Apr. 3, 1998). 
 79 Ch. 70, 9 Stat. 237 (1848) (repealed 1953); see also Wesley J. Heath, America’s 
First Drug Regulation Regime: The Rise and Fall of the Import Drug Act of 1848, 59 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 169, 175–77 (2004). 
 80 Heath, supra note 79, at 179. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Pub. L. No. 100-293, 102 Stat. 95 (1988) (codified as amended at scattered sections 
of 21 U.S.C.). 
 83 See Robert Angarola & Judith Beach, The Prescription Drug Marketing Act: A 
Solution in Search of  a Problem?, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 21, 21 (1996) (“Congress’ 
intent in passing this legislation was to avoid what it considered ‘an unacceptable risk 
that counterfeit, adulterated, misbranded, subpotent or expired drugs will be sold to 
American consumers.’”). 
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relevant provision prohibits anyone but the original manufacturer 
of a prescription drug from importing or “re-importing” it to the 
United States (unless it is required for emergency medical care).84 
In the 1990s, concern over pharmaceutical safety began to give 
way to public outrage over high prices.  This resulted in the 
passage of the Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act of 2000 
(“MEDS”), which contains a specific Congressional resolution that 
“Americans should be able to purchase medicines at prices that are 
comparable to prices for such medicines in other countries.”85  
Though it is often lost in recent rhetoric, the four-year-old law 
actually creates a specific exception to the PDMA that would allow 
for the non-manufacturer importation of pharmaceuticals with 
appropriate FDA oversight.86  It requires the HHS Secretary to 
“promulgate regulations permitting pharmacists and wholesalers to 
import into the United States [products covered by the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act].”87  However, the Act requires that 
safeguards be in place to ensure that imported drugs comply with 
the safety and effectiveness requirements of domestic drugs.88  
Unfortunately, it does not detail what would be sufficient to 
demonstrate a showing of safety and effectiveness short of 
satisfying all of the formal requirements of an NDA or an ANDA.  
More importantly, the Act has a major limitation on its 
implementation.  It explicitly states: 
This section shall become effective only if the Secretary 
demonstrates to the Congress that the implementation of 
this section will — 
(1) pose no additional risk to the public’s health and safety; 
and 
 
 84 21 U.S.C. § 381(d) (2003). 
 85 Pub. L. No. 106-387, 114 Stat. 1549 (2000) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 333, 384). 
 86 21 U.S.C. § 384(j) (2000) (abrogating the authority of the Secretary to regulate 
imports under 21 U.S.C. § 381(d)(1)); William Davis, The Medicine Equity and Drug 
Safety Act of 2000: Releasing Gray Market Pharmaceuticals, 9 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
483, 487–88 (2001). 
 87 21 U.S.C. § 384(a) (2003). 
 88 21 U.S.C. § 384(b) (2003). 
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(2) result in a significant reduction in the cost of covered 
products to the American consumer.89 
In other words, the HHS Secretary must vouch for the safety 
and effectiveness of drugs imported through this procedure.  
Although this section of the law was revised in 2003, the 
certification provision was left intact.90  To date, both HHS 
Secretaries who have held office after the enactment of MEDS 
have concluded that no such demonstration can be made.91  This 
has obviously frustrated the original proponents of the bill, as well 
as advocates of importation; recent legislative initiatives have 
attempted to modify this requirement. 
Of course, safety concerns are not entirely spurious and care is 
required in revising relevant regulatory statutes.  If the HHS 
Secretary’s prerequisite obligation to investigate and certify safety 
is relaxed or eliminated, some other mechanism must be created to 
ensure safety, lest a lawless and uncontrollable trade in foreign 
drugs emerges.  Even without formal HHS inspection of all 
imported drugs, the safety of the drugs could be addressed by a 
restructuring of the importation system or through the use of an 
alternate oversight agency. 
The simplest solution is to allow only imports from countries 
with pharmaceutical regulatory systems similar to that in the 
United States.92  Canada, and the more advanced members of the 
 
 89 21 U.S.C. § 384(l) (2003). 
 90 See MMA, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 804, 117 Stat. 2066, 2464–65 (2003).  Although 
the MMA revisions inserted an entirely new § 804, most of the language is identical to 
the prior section.  It is not clear that all differences were intended to substantively change 
the law.  For example, in the HHS Secretary’s safety and efficacy voucher, the word 
“demonstrates” was changed to “certifies,” but it does not appear to modify the essence 
of the requirement. See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 91 See Letter from HHS Secretary Tommy G. Thompson to Sen. James Jeffords (July 9, 
2001), http://www.fda.gov/oc/po/thompson/medsact.html (“You and other Senators and 
Representatives asked that I reconsider former Secretary Shalala’s decision and make the 
determination necessary to implement the MEDS Act. . . . After a thorough review of the 
law, FDA has concluded that it would be impossible to ensure that the MEDS Act would 
result in no loss of protection for the drugs supplied to the American people.”). 
 92 See Robert Pinco, Implications of FDA’s Proposal to Include Foreign Marketing 
Experience in the Over-the-Counter Drug Review Process, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 105, 
110–11 (1998) (stating that the countries in Western Europe have sophisticated drug 
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European Union93 have a reputation of regulatory sophistication 
that should satisfy the safety and efficacy requirements of the 
United States.  This argument is often presented as a counter to the 
pharmaceutical industry’s position that imported drugs necessarily 
compromise safety.94  Another solution, which could be used in 
combination with a controlled-country scheme, is to limit imports 
to large, commercial importers who can better guarantee the source 
of the drugs purchased overseas.  Both of these ideas were 
addressed in a comprehensive review of the costs and benefits of 
drug importation recently completed by the HHS Task Force on 
Drug Importation.95  The Task Force found that the safety 
advantages of limiting importation to certain countries with 
advanced regulatory systems may not be as promising as would 
appear, because those countries have no incentive to ensure the 
safety of exports.96  This is particularly true for products that are 
merely “transshipped” through a foreign country, never threatening 
to impact the health and safety of that country’s citizens.97  On the 
other hand, the Task Force found that a safe commercial 
importation program is theoretically feasible, though it would 
require the commitment of significant additional resources and the 
revision of current statutory authority if the federal government 
 
regulatory systems and reviewing the EU Directives that ensure regulatory continuity 
among member states). 
 93 Importantly, although importation proponents often include “European Union” 
countries as equivalent in terms of regulatory sophistication, the recent addition of ten 
members to the Union has altered that landscape somewhat. See Richard Bernstein, 
Change Coming Slowly for New Members of European Union, CHI. TRIB., May 9, 2004, 
at 10.  It may be prudent to consider the regulatory regimes of each member individually 
rather than for the Union as a whole. 
 94 See, e.g., Examining the Implications of Drug Importation, Hearings Before the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Senator Byron 
Dorgan) (describing importation provisions in Senate Bill S. 2328, and declaring 
“commercial importation by pharmacists and wholesalers could only occur from a limited 
number of countries—Canada, Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and 
Switzerland—that have drug regulatory systems comparable to our own.”). 
 95 DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HHS TASK FORCE ON DRUG IMPORTATION, 
REPORT ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG INFORMATION (2004) [hereinafter HHS REPORT], available 
at http://www.hhs.gov/importtaskforce/Report1220.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2005). 
 96 Id. at 60–61 (“[M]ost countries do not have the legal or regulatory tools available to 
guarantee the safety , quality, or efficacy of products exported to the U.S.”). 
 97 Id. 
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were to administer it effectively.98  The Task Force determined that 
the economic benefits of drug importation could be quite small in 
comparison to these costs, potentially less than a percent of current 
spending.99 
In view of the Task Force’s conclusions regarding the strain on 
current federal regulatory resources, perhaps the most provocative 
option involves the participation of state governments, which have 
the purchasing and police power of a state actor at their disposal.  
The entry of these players into the importation game may 
significantly modify the playing field.  Moreover, the lack of 
Congressional action over recent months has spurred other 
governmental entities to become involved, and their proposed 
programs are not necessarily dependent on a change in the current 
federal statute. 
B. Importation Proposals by Certain State or Local Governments 
Seek to Circumvent or Supplement Federal Legislative Action 
Fighting for low priced pharmaceuticals has emerged as a 
popular position for both major political parties100 and thus, a large 
number of officials at various governmental levels have offered an 
opinion.  It is easy to argue that opening the borders to drug 
imports is a simple way of reducing costs without the political risk 
and administrative hassle of imposing U.S. price controls or some 
alternative new regulatory measure.  In addition, it has the outward 
 
 98 Id. at 41–44.  The more controlled nature of a commercial importation program 
would allow the FDA to maintain a so-called “closed system” of drug distribution, which 
is essential for assuring safety. Id. at 41.  Conversely, the Task Force concluded that 
permitting wide-scale personal importation was likely to lead to preclude the ability to 
maintain a safe drug supply. Id. at 44. 
 99 According to the Task Force, three factors primarily reduce the likelihood of savings: 
(1) most of the savings is likely to be captured by commercial importers, (2) thirty 
percent of total drug spending is for drugs that cannot be imported, and (3) the supply of 
foreign drugs is limited. Id. at 67.  Conversely, the Task Force determined that the 
negative impact on resources for innovation could be quite large. Id. at 82 (“Our analysis 
show that legalizing importation would adversely affect R&D of new drugs, causing 
future drug consumers to forego the health benefits associated with innovation.”). 
 100 Both Republican and Democratic Senators and Representatives have expressed 
support for legislation to ease pharmaceutical import restrictions. See, e.g., 
Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act of 2004, S. 2328, 108th Cong. 
(2004) (noting co-sponsors such as Trent Lott, John McCain and Edward Kennedy). 
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appearance of a free market solution to an unfair price 
discrimination scheme (though many would argue with that 
characterization).101  The state governments of Minnesota,102 
Illinois,103 Wisconsin,104 Vermont,105 New Hampshire,106 and 
Iowa,107 together with cities like Springfield108 and Boston, 
 
 101 See, e.g., Importation of Prescription Drugs, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on 
Health, Education, Labor & Pensions, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Prof. James 
Vernon): 
[R]eimporting patented pharmaceuticals from outside the United States is not a 
free trade issue.  This is a common misunderstanding.  The rationale for free 
trade is based on the doctrine of comparative advantage: where countries 
specialize in the production of goods and services for which they are, 
comparatively speaking, low-cost producers, and then trade freely with other 
countries doing the same thing. . . . But pharmaceutical prices in Canada and 
elsewhere are lower because drug prices are regulated in those markets, and not 
because those countries have a comparative advantage in the production of 
pharmaceuticals . . . . 
 102 See Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs., Fact Sheet, Minnesota’s Plan to Access 
Affordable Prescription Medicines [hereinafter “Minnesota Plan”] (“In September 2003, 
Governor Pawlenty directed the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) to 
review the feasibility of importing prescription medicine from Canada.  Like Minnesota, 
Canadian provinces license and regulate pharmacies in their jurisdictions.  As a result of 
that review, Minnesota is pursuing a three-phase approach that will allow Minnesotans to 
safely purchase low-cost brand name prescription medicine.”), available at 
http://www.state.mn.us/mn/externalDocs/Rx/Rx_Fact_sheet_pdf_012804101245_Rxplan
factsheet061704.pdf (last modified June 17, 2004). 
 103 See State of Ill., Fact Sheet, The Fight for Affordable Prescription Drugs [hereinafter 
“Illinois Plan”] (“Illinois is exploring ways to safely import less expensive Canadian 
drugs.”), at http://www.affordabledrugs.il.gov/factsheet.cfm (last visited Jan. 29, 2005). 
 104 See State of Wis., Prescription Drug Resource Center [hereinafter “Wisconsin 
Plan”] (“If the federal government isn’t willing to take on the drug companies and fight 
for more affordable prices, states like Wisconsin will have to lead the way.”), at 
http://www.drugsavings.wi.gov (last visited Jan. 29, 2005). 
 105 See Vt. Dep’t of Pers., Tackling the Prescription Drug Crisis, at  
http://vermontpersonnel.org/htm/prescription.php (last updated Sept. 3, 2004) [hereinafter 
“Vermont Plan”] (“[T]he State of Vermont petitioned the FDA to approve a pilot 
program of importation and State of Vermont officials continue to advocate for a change 
in the position taken by the federal government.”). 
 106 See Christopher Rowland, N.H. to Obtain Drugs via Canada, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 
10, 2003, at A1 (“New Hampshire will set up a program to import prescription drugs 
from Canada . . . to reduce state prescription drug costs even if it means defying the Food 
and Drug Administration.”). 
 107 See Press Release, Office of the Governor, State of Iowa, Vilsack Says Iowa Could 
Save Millions Purchasing Prescription Drugs from Canada (Nov. 7, 2003), available at 
http://www.governor.state.ia.us/news/2003/november/november0703_1.html; Ceci 
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Massachusetts,109 Montgomery, Alabama,110 and Los Angeles, 
California,111 have proposed drug import plans. 
In what is perhaps a reflection of the ambiguity regarding the 
legality of drug imports, several of these government entities have 
taken only the tentative step of establishing Internet “portals” to 
Canadian pharmacy websites.112  These initiatives are promoted 
primarily as an information dissemination program, allowing 
consumers to make the ultimate choice in purchasing their 
drugs.113  Additionally, some states that have proposed much more 
 
Connolly, Iowa Plans to Procure Drugs from Canada; State Joins Growing Group 
Seeking Cheaper Medicines Outside U.S., WASH. POST., Sept. 24, 2003, at A2. 
 108 See Ceci Connolly, Drug Reimportation Plan Saves City $2.5 Million; Apparent 
Success in Massachusetts Is Still a Fight in Washington, WASH. POST, July 15, 2004, at 
A3 (“Thanks to the Landrys and 3,200 other city workers who have opted to order their 
prescription drugs from a licensed Canadian pharmacy, deficit- plagued Springfield has 
saved $2.5 million in the year since it became the first city in the nation to sponsor such a 
program.”). 
 109 See Christopher Rowland, City Launches Program to Buy Imported Drugs, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Jul. 22, 2004, at A1 (“While the program is open to 14,000 people, city officials 
expect only a small fraction to participate because the incentive is small.  The city is 
waiving copayments for the Canadian option, but it is keeping copayments for domestic 
orders at a relatively low $10.  Savings for an individual would amount to just $40 a year 
over a domestic drug received through the mail.”). 
 110 See Cameron W. Barr, Montgomery Drug Plan Has Support Despite FDA, WASH. 
POST, Jul. 28, 2004, at B1 (“A majority of the Montgomery County Council is on record 
supporting a program that would probably involve importing lower-cost prescription 
drugs from Canada for county employees and retirees.”). 
 111 See Lisa Rapaport, City Council Plan Would Buy Prescription Drugs for Los Angeles 
Residents, KNIGHT RIDDER TRIB. BUS. NEWS, Mar. 19, 2004, at 1. 
 112 See, e.g., State of New Hampshire, New Hampshire’s Medicine Cabinet (discussing 
various options for obtaining cheaper drugs including importation from Canada, and 
containing a link to the Canadian Internet pharmacy, CanadaDrugs.com), available at 
http://www.egov.nh.gov/medicine%2Dcabinet/default.asp (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).  It 
is worth noting that state drug importation websites often include disclaimers disclaiming 
liability “with respect to any product offered, or pharmaceutical care provided, by the 
pharmacies listed on this website.” See, e.g., State of Minn., Minnesota RxConnect 
Online, Legal Information, at http://www.state.mn.us/cgi-bin/portal/mn/jsp/content.do?-
programid=536902438&agency=Rx (last visited Apr. 8, 2005). 
 113 See, e.g., Wisconsin Plan, supra note 95 (“The goal is to let consumers make an 
informed choice among all of the available options—including local pharmacies, lower 
price generics available domestically, and safe Canadian pharmacies.”). 
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involved import plans view the establishment of an Internet portal 
as a first stage.114 
A somewhat more powerful category of initiatives includes 
those programs that would alter the current system for health care 
reimbursements to provide a preference for lower-priced, imported 
drugs.115  This is not unlike the cost-control design of many 
European health care systems.116  However, state reimbursement 
control is likely to have a limited impact due to the relatively small 
percentage of the population served by such programs.117 
The most aggressive programs actually envision government 
importation of pharmaceuticals for their citizens.118  In essence, the 
government entity would act as a pharmaceutical wholesaler, 
directly selling drugs that are priced at, or only marginally above, 
the discounted foreign purchase prices.  A primary advantage of 
this mechanism is the ability of a state government to utilize its 
own health inspection services, such as a state pharmacy board, to 
investigate not only the quality of the drugs being imported, but 
also the facilities in which they are manufactured and packaged.119  
 
 114 See, e.g., Minnesota Plan, supra note 93 (explaining Minnesota’s three-phase 
importation plan beginning with a Web portal). 
 115 See, e.g., City of Boston Meds By Mail, at http://www.cityofboston.gov/publichealth-
/medsbymail.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2005) (“People who use this program will pay no 
co-payment for the medicines from this service.  Right now, the program is available only 
to employees and retirees enrolled in the Blue Cross Blue Shield health plans.”). 
 116 See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text. 
 117 See Rowland, supra note 109. 
 118 See Minnesota Plan, supra note 102 (“State officials are working with the Minnesota 
congressional delegation to acquire statutory authority to allow Minnesota to import 
medicine after establishing a reasonable system that provides for the safety of Minnesota 
citizens.”). 
 119 Id.  An example of the use of state resources in this fashion is the State of 
Minnesota’s recent inspection of Canadian pharmaceutical facilities in support of that 
state’s own importation initiatives. See Prescription Drug Importation; Among Pharmacy 
Complaints in Minnesota, None Are About Canadian Imports, DRUG WK., Apr. 16, 2004, 
at 309 (“Among the problems, their report found that some Canadian pharmacies do not 
take complete patient medical histories, do not ask whether patients have had allergic 
drug reactions in the past, and do not use child-resistant safety caps on drug containers.”); 
Letter from William Hubbard, Assoc. Comm’r of Pol’y and Plan., FDA, to Minn. Gov. 
Tim Pawlenty (May 24, 2004) (“While I understand that Minnesota sent inspectors on 
pre-announced visits to Canada to ‘inspect’ the Canadian pharmacies that would dispense 
these drugs, it has become apparent that your inspectors found numerous deficiencies in 
those pharmacies, refused to certify the vast majority, and had doubts even about the few 
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One of the most advanced initiatives to date is the I-SaveRx 
program developed by the State of Illinois.120  The program 
permits residents of member states to obtain discount refills of 
more than one hundred different drugs imported from Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and Ireland.121  According to the program 
website, it “operates under a stringent system of quality controls,” 
uses pharmacies that “are inspected and approved by state 
regulatory agencies,” and assures its participants that “pharmacies 
[used by the program] in other countries follow the same standards 
and procedures used by Illinois pharmacies.”122  In addition to 
Illinois, the states of Wisconsin, Kansas, Missouri, and Vermont 
have agreed to the program.123 
Despite the advantages in terms of safety and impact, state 
involvement in pharmaceutical importation raises a broad range of 
problems—foremost is the risk that a state could face tort liability 
for the resale of dangerous or defective drugs.124  Opponents of 
state importation programs argue that the costs from future 
litigation settlements and judgments will offset many gains in cost 
savings for state treasuries.125  The likelihood of incurring liability 
 
that you ultimately accepted for your Minnesota RxConnect program.”), at 
http://www.fda.gov/importeddrugs/pawlenty0524.html. 
 120 See I-SaveRx, About I-SaveRx, at http://www.i-saverx.net/ (last visited Apr. 8, 
2005). 
 121 See I-SaveRx, Frequently Asked Questions: General Questions, at http://www.i-
saverx.net/general.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2005). 
 122 Id. 
 123 See I-SaveRx, About I-SaveRx, at http://www.i-saverx.net/ (last visited Apr. 8, 
2005). 
 124 See, e.g., HHS REPORT, supra note 95, at 107–08 (reviewing the potential for states 
and municipalities to face liability for drug importation, assuming the waiver of 
sovereign immunity for such suits); Gloria Gonzalez, Governments’ Immunity to Drug 
Injury Lawsuits Questioned, BUS. INS., Jun. 14, 2004, at 10. 
 125 See Ctr. for Individual Freedom, Importing Liability, at http://www.cfif.org/htdocs-
/legislative_issues/state_issues/drug_importation.htm (Apr. 22, 2004) (“With the average 
American filling 10 prescriptions per year and the last U.S. Census counting Wisconsin’s 
population at more than 5 million, liability awards will swiftly wipe out any anticipated 
‘savings,’ leaving taxpayers digging deep in their pockets to pay for more drug-induced 
claims.”). 
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may be enhanced because unauthorized pharmaceutical imports 
violate federal laws meant to ensure drug safety and efficacy.126 
Throughout this extensive drug import dialog, with respective 
camps debating issues like drug safety and accessibility, hardly a 
word has been uttered regarding the property rights of the 
companies producing the drugs.127  Perhaps the lack of 
conversation is partly because the American public is unlikely to 
sympathize with the patent owner.  However, even those who try 
to anticipate the pharmaceutical companies’ efforts to thwart 
importation almost never mention patents.128  It appears that the 
very idea that an intellectual property right could stand in the way 
of a health care crisis remedy is difficult to conceive.129  That 
patents should be accorded the blockade powers of tangible 
property seems somehow novel. 
In contrast, the relevant law indicates that the intellectual 
property rights at play in the import debate are quite powerful, as 
well as complex.  This is especially true if the full property 
protections mandated by the U.S. Constitution are applied.  An 
analysis of precisely what property rights exist and how they will 
affect the various parties who may be involved in drug imports is 
necessary as a predicate to predictions on the future of property 
recognition. 
 
 
 126 See Gonzalez, supra note 124 (“Legal experts, though, say the liability protection the 
governments are counting on may not withstand legal challenges, because reimportation 
is illegal.”). 
 127 But see HHS REPORT, supra note 95, at 92–95 (providing a broad overview of 
intellectual property obstacles to importation, though with little substantive analysis). 
 128 For example, although pharmaceutical importation has been a legislative issue since 
at least the MEDS Act (see supra notes 85–89 and accompanying text), it was not until 
2004 that a bill was introduced that addressed the patent issues involved in importation 
(see infra notes 378–81). 
 129 See, e.g., Cahoy, supra note 7, at 125–28 (describing the public outrage upon finding 
that a patent right could indeed restrict access to a drug needed during a health care 
crisis). 
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III. PROPERTY BARRIERS TO IMPORTING PHARMACEUTICALS 
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION OF THE PATENT OWNER 
Each type of intellectual property has associated with it a 
slightly different set of exclusions; to know whether a property 
right’s borders have been transgressed requires an appreciation of 
these specific characteristics.130  In the case of U.S. patents, one 
who without authorization makes, uses, sells, offers to sell, or 
imports into this country the invention covered by the patent is 
deemed an infringer.131  This is quite far-reaching.  If a 
pharmaceutical company owns a patent that covers the basic 
composition of a drug or its primary medical use, it may essentially 
prevent others from doing anything with the compound that would 
undercut the company’s limited period of exclusivity.132  Because 
there is essentially no “fair use” defense in patent law, the right 
extends to activities that are seemingly not in direct conflict with 
the patent holder’s pecuniary interests, such as academic 
research.133  A so-called “research exemption” exists for those in 
 
 130 This can be better understood if one imagines an object covered by patent, copyright, 
and trademark protection.  One infringes the patent if, without authorization, one “uses” 
the invention embodied in the object (see 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2003)), but infringes the 
copyright only if the use constitutes a public performance or display (see 17 U.S.C. § 106 
(2003)) of copyrighted expression, and infringes the trademark only if the use of a mark 
creates a likelihood of confusion or dilutes the owner’s mark (see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 
1125 (2003)).  One act may infringe all three, some, or none of the rights. 
 131 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). 
 132 See, e.g., John H. Barton, Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent 
Breadth and Sequential Innovation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 449, 449–53 (1997) (noting that 
broad patents are common in fields like biotechnology, but arguing that the “follow-on” 
innovator must be protected).  It has been noted that there is an economic rationale for 
allowing a patentee to exclude a field of subsequent innovation with a strong initial patent 
right. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 871 (1990) (describing Edmund Kitch’s “prospect 
theory” of patent rights). 
 133 In the context of patents, the closest equivalent to “fair use” is experimental use, 
which has been so narrowly construed as to be essentially hypothetical. See Madey v. 
Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003) 
(finding that Duke University’s use of a patented laser for academic research did not 
qualify because “regardless of whether a particular institution or entity is engaged in an 
endeavor for commercial gain, so long as the act is in furtherance of the alleged 
infringer’s legitimate business and is not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, 
or for strictly philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very narrow and 
strictly limited experimental use defense.”). 
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the process of submitting applications to a U.S. regulatory agency 
(such as an ANDA),134 but it is extremely narrow. 
While this would seem to confer oppressively far-reaching 
power on those who own patents, there is an important limitation 
that curbs such control.  After a patent owner has made an 
unconditioned sale135 of an article covered by the patent right, the 
patentee’s power over that article is deemed “exhausted.”136  In 
particular, the purchaser cannot be restrained in his or her use or 
disposal of that particular article (unless substantial reconstruction 
would have the effect of creating a new article).137  The idea is that 
a patent owner has received compensation for the rights attached to 
the article as a consequence of the sale, and allowing the patentee 
to tax continued use would constitute double compensation.138  
Although a straightforward reading of the patent statute makes no 
reference to the exhaustion doctrine, it is well established in 
 
 134 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2003); Apotex v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1338 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) (“The Act permitted a company wishing to develop a generic version of an 
approved drug to manufacture and use the drug for development purposes without 
infringing any patent claiming the approved drug.”). 
 135 The sale of a patented article with certain conditions may transform the sale into a 
license, eliminating the application of the exhaustion doctrine. See Daniel R. Cahoy, 
Oasis or Mirage: Efficient Breach as a Relief to the Burden of Patent and Copyright 
Limitations, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 135, 155 (2003) (noting that even a label placed on 
an article may be sufficient to create a patent license) (citing Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. 
Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708–09 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). 
 136 See, e.g., United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942) (“[S]ale of [a 
patented article] exhausts the monopoly in that article and the patentee may not 
thereafter, by virtue of his patent, control the use or disposition of the article.”); Intel 
Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“The law is well 
settled that an authorized sale of a patented product places that product beyond the reach 
of the patent.”). 
 137 See FMC Corp. v. Up-Right, Inc., 21 F.3d 1073, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 138 See Margreth Barrett, The United States’ Doctrine of Exhaustion: Parallel Imports of 
Patented Goods, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 911, 913–14 (2000).  Subsequent sales are presumed 
to be outside of the inventor’s view. Id. at 913. 
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common law patent jurisprudence139 and is reflected in the law 
related to other intellectual property rights.140 
The application of the patent exhaustion principle in the world 
of pharmaceuticals is relatively clear: once a drug covered by one 
or more patents is sold, the pharmaceutical company has no power 
to limit further use or resale of that drug by the purchaser.  The 
purchaser of a bottle of pills, for example, should be able to use or 
dispose of them without an accounting to the patent owner (so long 
as no other state or federal laws are violated).  This would seem to 
resolve the conflict of patent rights and importation.  
Unfortunately, this description is incomplete.  The concept of 
exhaustion depends upon an authorized sale under the patent 
owner’s rights, and in the global context, it is difficult to determine 
the appropriate borders for that right.  Surprisingly, the situation 
has not become much clearer in recent years.  Indeed, the 
limitations of patent exhaustion are one of the most contentious 
issues for the international legal community to solve, due in no 
small part to the effect on the pharmaceutical market. 
 
 139 Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. 340, 350 (1864) (“[W]hen a patentee has himself 
constructed the machine and sold it, or authorized another to construct and sell it, or to 
construct and use and operate it, and the consideration has been paid to him for the right, 
he has then to that extent parted with his monopoly, and ceased to have any interest 
whatever in the machine so sold or so authorized to be constructed and operated.”); 
Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539 (1852); Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. 646 (1846). 
 140 Specifically, the exhaustion doctrine also restrains the power of copyright and 
trademark owners.  It is more commonly referred to as the “first sale doctrine” in those 
contexts, but its operation is essentially the same.  The sale of an item containing 
copyrighted material conveys to the item’s new owner the right to sell or destroy it, and a 
somewhat more limited right to use it. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000); Quality King 
Distribs., Inc. v. L’Anza, 523 U.S. 135, 150–51 (1998) (finding that a provision giving 
copyright owners exclusive rights over the importation of copyrighted goods is subject to 
the limitations in § 109(a)). Similarly, the authorized sale of an item bearing the 
trademark of another prevents the trademark owner from restricting the subsequent use or 
sale of the item. See, e.g., Davidoff & CIE, S.A. v. PLD Int’l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297, 
1301–02 (11th Cir. 2001); Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 150 F.3d 298, 303 n.4 (3d Cir. 
1998); Enesco Corp. v. Price/Costco Inc., 146 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1998).  In the 
case of copyright law, the first sale doctrine is expressly written into the Copyright Act. 
17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000). 
CAHOY 4/25/2005  4:19 PM 
2005] PROPERTY BARRIERS TO PHARMACEUTICAL IMPORTATION 657 
A. The United States’ Refusal to Recognize an International 
Exhaustion Rule 
The issue of intellectual property exhaustion for sales within a 
sovereign nation is, for the most part, well settled; a rule similar to 
that in the United States is almost uniformly applied among the 
industrialized nations.141  However, there are differences with 
regard to the treatment of sales that take place outside of the 
country in question,142 particularly in the case of patent rights.  
While many countries apply a blanket exhaustion rule that 
encompasses all sales, regardless of the locale, the U.S. is far from 
alone in distinguishing between national and international 
exhaustion.143  Some countries even apply a hybrid rule, which 
recognizes exhaustion for sales within a particular group of 
countries, but not internationally.144 Interestingly, while 
 
 141 See, e.g., Erlikhman, supra note 10, at 323–31 (reviewing the patent exhaustion rules 
of the U.S., Japan, and the EU, and showing that all have at least a national or regional 
exhaustion policy). 
 142 Is there a difference if the first sale is made in the United States to an exporter for 
sale in another country?  A distinction may exist if the exporter is bound by express 
contract to sell outside the United States.  In that case, U.S. rights would not be exhausted 
by the sale. See, e.g., Ariz. Cartridge Remanufactures Ass’n v. Lexmark Int’l Inc., 290 F. 
Supp. 2d 1034, 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“In the case of a conditional sale, the purchaser 
does not receive the same implied license that the purchaser in an unconditional sale 
receives.  Thus, where the purchaser of an unconditional sale has every right to repair the 
device, the purchaser of a conditional sale does not.”); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 249 F. 
Supp. 2d 746, 753 (N.D. Miss. 2001) (“The exhaustion doctrine only applies where the 
sale or license of the patented invention is an unconditional one.”). 
 143 See Int’l Ass’n for the Prot. of Intell. Prop. (“AIPPI”), International Exhaustion of 
Industrial Property Rights, Summary Report, Question Q 156 (Mar. 23–30, 2001) 
[hereinafter “AIPPI Report”] (“The following states do not apply a rule of international 
exhaustion of patents: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, Paraguay, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom, United States and Yugoslavia.  In contrast, Argentina, Canada, 
Singapore and Venezuela do apply a rule of international exhaustion to patents.”), 
available at http://www.aippi.org/reports/q156/q156-Summary-e.htm; see also Darren E. 
Donnelly, Comment, Parallel Trade and International Harmonization of the Exhaustion 
of Rights Doctrine, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 445, 468–84 (1997). 
 144  See AIPPI Report, supra note 143 (“Some groups [representing member states] 
described regional Exhaustion of Patents within the EEA, following the decisions of the 
ECJ in Centrapharm v Sterling Drug (C-15/74, 31 October 1974) and Merck v Stephar 
(C-187/80, 14 July 1981), as occurring when a product covered by a patent is marketed 
within the EEA by the patent owner or with consent.”). 
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harmonization of such disparate intellectual property rules has 
been a primary goal of several international treaties, intellectual 
property exhaustion has so far eluded consensus treatment.  In fact, 
the relatively recent and comprehensive treaty known as Trade-
Related aspects of Intellectual Property agreement (“TRIPs”) 
expressly states that it does not address intellectual property 
exhaustion, leaving the issue for individual countries to resolve.145  
Similarly, regional treaties, such as the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (“NAFTA”) also tend to skirt the issue,146 even though 
one would think the opportunities for consensus are greater when 
only two or three parties are negotiating.  One exception is the 
recent U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement (“UAFTA”) which 
contains an exhaustion provision, but it may be limited to 
contractual restrictions.147  Today, there is no evidence that the 
international community is any closer to agreement on this issue.  
Thus, a patchwork of exhaustion rules exists across the globe. 
The international exhaustion paradigm is typified by the 
Canadian scheme, which covers all intellectual property rights in 
that country.148  Because Canada is a common law country, its 
exhaustion rule is based largely in the decisions of its courts, but 
the effect is the same as if enacted by statute.149  If a product 
 
 145 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 44, art. 6 (“[N]othing in [TRIPs] shall be used to 
address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights.”). 
 146 Lans Noah, NAFTA’s Impact on the Trade in Pharmaceuticals, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 
1293, 1303 (1997). 
 147 See U.S.-Australian Free Trade Agreement, May 18, 2004, Art. 17.9, ¶ 4 (“[T]he 
exclusive right of the patent owner to prevent importation of a patented product, or a 
product that results from a patented process, without the consent of the patent owner shall 
not be limited by the sale or distribution of that product outside its territory, at least 
where the patentee has placed restrictions on importation by contract or other means.”), 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Australia_FTA-
/Final_Text/asset_upload_file148_5168.pdf (last visited Apr. 8,2005).  The phrase “at 
least” may have been added to permit each country to adopt an international exhaustion 
rule that could be limited by contract. See infra note 149–151 and accompanying text. 
 148 See International Exhaustion of Industrial Property Rights, Canadian Group Report, 
Report Q 156 [hereinafter Canadian Report], available at http://www.aippi.org-
/reports/q156/gr-q156-Canada-e.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2005); Erlikhman, supra note 
9, at 337–38. 
 149 Canadian Report, supra note 148, at 48 (“The question of international exhaustion of 
I.P. Rights is, with the exception of an express provision in the Canadian Copyright Act, 
one which has not been addressed in any of the I.P. legislation in Canada to date and, 
accordingly, it has been left to the Canadian courts to seek to develop a body of law 
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covered by an intellectual property right, including a patent, is sold 
or produced in a foreign country under authorization of the 
intellectual property owner, the right to control the product by 
virtue of the property right disappears.150  However, it may be 
possible for an intellectual property owner to retain some rights if 
the foreign sale is restricted by explicit contract (and the importer 
is aware of the contract).151  This rather liberal rule creates a 
presumption of exhaustion, and is the approach most favored by 
developing nations.152 
Members of the European Economic Area (“EEA”),153 on the 
other hand, are obligated to apply a regional exhaustion rule that 
pertains to sales within the member states.154  Countries that would 
otherwise have no international exhaustion rule will treat sales 
within the EEA as if they occurred within the member state, 
regardless of whether the intellectual property owner consented to 
EEA-wide marketing.155  Interestingly, proposed European 
 
based in part on the jurisprudence in other common law countries such as the United 
Kingdom.”). 
 150 Id. at 49–50. 
 151 Id. at 51. 
 152 See Catalin Cosovanu, Piracy, Price Discrimination, and Development: The 
Software Sector in Eastern Europe and Other Emerging Markets, 31 AIPLA Q. J. 165, 
197 n.104 (2003) (“Moreover, developing countries have generally favored international 
exhaustion, while developed countries have been mostly on the side of territorial (i.e., 
either national or regional, e.g., European Union wide) exhaustion.”). 
 153 The EEA consists of members of the European Union plus other European nations 
that wish to have the economic benefits of EU membership without all of the 
responsibilities. See Agreement on the European Economic Area, May 2, 1992, 1994 O.J. 
(L 1) 3 [hereinafter EEA Agreement]; see also European Commission, European 
Economic Area: Overview, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/eea (last 
updated Oct. 2004). 
 154 See Commission Communication on parallel imports of proprietary medicinal 
products for which marketing authorisations have already been granted, COM(2003)839  
final at 10 (“[T]he owner of an industrial and commercial property right protected by 
Member State legislation may not rely on that legislation to oppose the importation of a 
product which has been lawfully placed on the market in another Member State by, or 
with the consent of, the proprietor of that right. The right is considered to have been 
exhausted once the product has been put on the market somewhere in the Community.”), 
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2003/com2003_08-
39en01.pdf. 
 155 See International Exhaustion of Industrial Property Rights, French Group Report, 
Report Q 156 [hereinafter French Report], available at http://www.aippi.org/reports-
/q156/gr-q156-France-f.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2005) (noting that France has no 
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Community legislation actually appears to take a position against a 
broader international exhaustion rule.156  The community 
exhaustion rule could be suspended by a licensee’s breach of a 
restrictive personal contract (so long as the contract complies with 
applicable competition rules).  However, absent a specific 
restriction, exhaustion within the EEA is presumed. 
While the United States is in line with proponents of 
international exhaustion in its legal scheme for copyright and 
trademark rights, it is truly on the other end of the spectrum in its 
treatment of patent rights.  As with Canada, U.S. patent rules are a 
consequence of a series of common law decisions rather than an 
explicit statutory structure.  The leading case is actually the 1890 
Supreme Court decision in Boesch v. Graff.157  It concerned 
Boesch’s alleged infringement of Graff’s U.S. patent on an 
improved lamp burner by importing infringing burners from 
Germany.158  Boesch was authorized to manufacture and sell the 
burners in Germany, but the U.S. patent owners (who were 
assignees of the party that originally owned both the U.S. and 
German rights) had not given Boesch permission to import the 
burners.159  The Supreme Court determined that a sale authorized 
under foreign law had no bearing on the rights of a U.S. patent 
owner.160  The importation was deemed infringing.161 
While the Boesch decision may seem ancient in the context of 
modern intellectual property law, as well as arguably 
distinguishable from many of the scenarios likely to occur in 
pharmaceutical imports, no other Supreme Court case has touched 
so specifically on the exhaustion issue.  A smattering of non-
 
international exhaustion rule, but does practice regional exhaustion as a member of the 
EEA). 
 156 See, e.g., Commission on the European Communities, Amended proposal for a 
European Parliament and Council Directive approximating the legal arrangements for 
the protection of inventions by utility model, 2000 O.J. (C 248 E) 56, 66 (“The rights 
conferred by a utility model shall, however, extend to acts concerning a product covered 
by that utility model which are done after that product has been put on the market outside 
the Community by the right-holder or with his consent.”). 
 157 133 U.S. 697 (1890). 
 158 Id. at 701–02. 
 159 Id. at 702. 
 160 Id. at 702–03. 
 161 Id. at 709. 
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precedential162 lower court cases have addressed the issue, either in 
accord with Boesch or distinguishing it on technical grounds,163 but 
those rulings were neither disputed nor affirmed at a national 
level.164  However, in 2001, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, the court authorized to hear all patent appeals and 
responsible for articulating national patent rules, decided a case 
that brought the scope of patent exhaustion back into the 
spotlight.165 
In Jazz Photo v. International Trade Commission,166 the 
Federal Circuit was primarily concerned with whether patents 
owned by Fuji Photo Film Co. covered the concept of single use 
cameras, and whether these patents were infringed by Jazz Photo’s 
refurbishment and resale of legally purchased Fuji cameras.167  
Since most of the cameras had been purchased in the U.S., the 
patent rights were exhausted except to the extent that Jazz Photo’s 
refurbishment constituted impermissible reconstruction of the 
 
 162 When the Federal Circuit became the sole circuit to which one can appeal cases 
arising under U.S. patent laws, it adopted as its precedent only the case law of the U.S. 
Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals announced before 
September 30, 1982. See South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 & n.2 (Fed. 
Cir. 1982). Thus, the weight of existing patent decisions from all other circuit courts was 
instantly reduced to merely persuasive. See generally id. at 1371 (“[N]o body of law 
established by any other court [other than the predecessor courts] would appear a suitable 
candidate for adoption.”). 
 163 See, e.g., Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft Eng’g Corp., 266 F. 
71, 79–80 (2d Cir. 1920) (finding that airplanes manufactured under patent license in 
Britain and imported into the United States did not infringe); Griffin v. Keystone 
Mushroom Farm, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 1283, 1285–87 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (sale of patented 
composting machines in Italy did not exhaust the U.S. patent); Sanofi, S.A. v. Med-Tech 
Veterinarian Prods., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 931, 940–41 (D.N.J. 1983) (finding that the 
foreign sale of chemical compounds by the patent owner did not exhaust the U.S. patent 
right where that right was the subject of an exclusive license to another). 
 164 See 7 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, 
VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 16.03[2][a][iv] (2001) (noting that “In the United States, 
the issue has arisen often with regard to trademark and copyright but relatively rarely 
with regard to patents.”). 
 165 The Federal Circuit is the only circuit court empowered to hear cases arising under 
U.S. patent laws. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 
Stat. 25 (1982). 
 166 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 950 (2002). 
 167 Id. at 1098–99.  The ITC is a named defendant because the case involved Fuji’s 
request that the agency restrict importation of Jazz Photo’s refurbished cameras under 19 
U.S.C. § 1337 (2000). 
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patented device.168  Making this assessment consumed most of the 
court’s opinion.  However, in a short but powerful passage, the 
court noted that Jazz Photo purchased some of the cameras at issue 
outside of the United States, and found that these would infringe 
regardless of whether reconstruction took place: 
United States patent rights are not exhausted by products of 
foreign provenance.  To invoke the protection of the first 
sale doctrine, the authorized first sale must have occurred 
under the United States patent.  See Boesch v. Graff, 133 
U.S. 697, 701-703 (1890) (a lawful foreign purchase does 
not obviate the need for license from the United States 
patentee before importation into and sale in the United 
States).  Our decision applies only to LFFPs for which the 
United States patent right has been exhausted by first sale 
in the United States.  Imported LFFPs of solely foreign 
provenance are not immunized from infringement of 
United States patents by the nature of their 
refurbishment.169 
By invoking such a broad articulation of the exhaustion rule, 
the court essentially foreclosed the argument that an overseas sale 
of a product under authority of the owner of U.S. patent rights 
could be re-imported without running afoul of the U.S. patent.170 
Some immediately proclaimed the decision in Jazz Photo to be 
an aberration and a fundamental misinterpretation of existing 
precedent.171  Others argued that the decision was contrary to the 
principle underlying the exhaustion rule and bad public policy as 
well, particularly in view of its negative effect on pharmaceutical 
importation.172  But there are also important economic and public 
 
 168 Id. at 1105. 
 169 Id. at 1105. 
 170 See id. 
 171 See Erlikhman, supra note 10, at 337. 
 172 See James Love & Sean Flynn, Legal and Policy Issues Concerning Parallel Trade 
(aka Re-Importation) of Pharmaceutical Drugs in the United States 1 (Mar. 31, 2004) 
(discussing the decision and stating “To authorize parallel importation of medicines, 
legislation should make it clear that U.S. patent rights are exhausted by the first sale of 
the patented product by the patent owner, or by a party who is authorized to use the 
patent.  Specifically, it needs to be clear that the United States has elected the rule of 
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policy reasons in support of the decision.  For example, it could be 
demonstrated that a national exhaustion rule would permit more 
efficient pharmaceutical pricing through international price 
discrimination.173  Additionally, given that exhaustion is premised 
on the idea that a patent owner is due payment for the use of the 
right only once, the fact that the “right” may be different from 
country to country (or even non-existent in some cases)174 is 
important.175  It is illogical to eliminate a right in one country 
based on a payment for a qualitatively different right in another 
country, particularly in view of the fact that such rights must be 
individually secured from each sovereign nation.176  Deciding 
whether Jazz Photo articulates the best rule clearly depends on 
one’s perspective. 
An intriguing aspect of Judge Newman’s opinion in Jazz Photo 
is that she articulated the national exhaustion rule with such 
brevity.  One could be forgiven for wondering if the powerful 
effect attributed to that one sentence in her opinion has been 
inflated or simply misinterpreted.  Fortunately, the Federal Circuit 
took the opportunity to revisit the issue four years later in an 
appeal of a subsequent matter in the same case.  In Fuji Photo Film 
Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp.,177 the defendant specifically requested 
that the Federal Circuit consider whether the earlier opinion 
 
international exhaustion of patent rights.”), at http://www.cptech.org/ip/fsd-
/love03312004.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2005); Erlikhman, supra note 10, at 337. 
 173 See Danzon & Towse, supra note 53, at 201–02 (concluding that price differentiation 
“would go a long way towards making drugs that are developed for high income 
countries available and affordable in [developing countries], while preserving incentives 
for R&D”). 
 174 For example, the scope of business methods patentable in the United States is much 
greater than in countries of the European Union. See Keith Maskus & Eina Wong, 
Searching for Economic Balance in Business Method Patents, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
289, 302–303 (2002) (noting the difficulties in comparing the economic effects of 
business method patents across countries due to the differences in protection accorded). 
 175 See John R. Thomas, Patents and Drug Importation, CONG. RES. SERV. REPT. 
RL32400 at 7–8 (May 2004).  Although agreements like TRIPs set a baseline for patent 
rights, there is no “international patent,” and subtle differences exist between each 
country’s national patent laws. 
 176 See MARTIN ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 813 (1998). 
 177 394 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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limited exhaustion to unauthorized foreign sales.178  The court 
determined that the rule was not so limited: 
The patentee’s authorization of an international first sale 
does not affect exhaustion of that patentee’s rights in the 
United States. . . . Moreover, Fuji’s foreign sales can never 
occur under a United States patent because the United 
States patent system does not provide for extraterritorial 
effect. . . . In Jazz, therefore, this court expressly limited 
first sales under the exhaustion doctrine to those occurring 
within the United States.179 
Given the fact that the 2001 Jazz Photo decision was denied 
certiorari,180 it is not clear that the 2005 decision, which is at most 
a clarification of the earlier stated exhaustion principle, is subject 
to Supreme Court review or en banc reconsideration by the Federal 
Circuit.181  Unless another case arises that provides an opportunity 
to revisit the issue, it appears to be unambiguously the law in the 
United States that foreign sales will not exhaust U.S. patent rights.  
Therefore, unauthorized importation of goods covered by U.S. 
patents creates significant liability for all who participate. 
B. A Patentee’s Success Using the Traditional  Infringement 
Litigation Depends on the Defendant 
Pharmaceutical companies are experienced at pursuing alleged 
infringers in federal court.182  The civil patent infringement system 
has the benefit of being relatively established through abundant 
case law,183 and predictable due to the existence of a single federal 
 
 178 Id. at 1376. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 536 U.S. 950 (2002). 
 181 The author of the 2005 opinion, Judge Rader, noted his desire to have the original 
decision heard en banc. See Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 
1094 n.* (Fed. Cir. 2001).  Now that six judges of the twelve-judge Federal Circuit have 
joined in stating a national exhaustion rule, it is unlikely that an en banc review would 
change the decision in any case. 
 182 See Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A 
Window on Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129 (2001) (finding that “drug” patent 
owners are more likely to engage in litigation than owners of patents in other fields). 
 183 See ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES Tbl. 2.2 (Mar. 
2003) (noting that there were 2814 patent cases filed in the U.S. district courts in 2003), 
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appeals court.184  Many believe that patent owners have an unfair 
advantage in the current litigation climate,185 but others have found 
that empirical evidence does not support that notion.186  In any 
case, the complexity and expense of patent litigation alone can be 
enough to dissuade potential infringers.187 
Considering the current legal environment with regard to 
exhaustion, it is clear that individuals who import pharmaceuticals 
face patent infringement liability.  One who imports a drug that 
was first sold overseas and is covered by composition and/or 
formulation patents would infringe both the patent owner’s sale 
and import rights.188  Additionally, if a drug is manufactured using 
a patented process, the importer is liable for infringement under a 
separate provision of the Patent Act, even if the resulting 
composition or formulation is not protected.189  However, it is 
unlikely that pharmaceutical companies will undertake the political 
risk and financial burden of pursing patent infringement lawsuits 
against individual importers.  Large private businesses that engage 
in importation present a more tempting target, and could be 
pursued by private litigants much as the federal government 
pursues these companies for violating FDA regulations,190 though 
it is unclear to what extent this brand of infringement is likely to 
 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/table2.02.pdf (last visited Jan. 
12, 2005). 
 184 See supra note 165. 
 185 See Hon. Richard Lin, The Future Role for the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit Now that it Has Turned 21, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 731, 732 (2004) (noting 
the development of a general perception that the Federal Circuit was pro-patent). 
 186 See Donald R. Dunner et al., A Statistical Look at the Federal Circuit’s Patent 
Decisions: 1982-1994, 5 FED. CIR. B.J. 151, 152 (1995); John R. Allison & Mark A. 
Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 
187 (1998). 
 187 Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 
1502 (2001) (stating that “the median cost of patent litigation to each side is $799,000 
through the end of discovery, and $1,503,000 through trial and appeal”). 
 188 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). 
 189 Id. § 271(g) (2000). 
 190 See Press Release, FDA, FDA Takes Action Against Companies That Are Importing 
Unapproved, Potentially Unsafe Drugs (Sept. 9, 2003) (describing an FDA request to the 
Justice Department to file a complaint against RX Depot for facilitating illegal shipments 
of prescription pharmaceuticals from foreign countries), available at http://www.fda.gov-
/bbs/topics/NEWS/2003/NEW00939.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2005). 
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occur.  Moreover, enforcement of patent infringement judgments 
against foreign defendants can be difficult.191 
Government pharmaceutical importation plans that envision 
direct involvement in bringing patented drugs across international 
borders create the greatest risk of litigation, partly because such 
importation initiatives are already in place,192 and also because of 
the deep pockets of these state actors.  In general, a government 
entity that engages in importation would violate the same 
provisions of the Patent Act as a private infringer.  And, even if a 
government’s plans merely facilitate import by others, the 
government entity may still face infringement liability.  Patents 
include the right to exclude the acts of parties that induce 
infringement.193  All that is required to make such a claim is that a 
defendant acted knowingly to induce another and that infringement 
actually occurred as a result of that inducement.194  To put it 
another way, the defendant must have the “specific intent” to 
encourage another’s infringement.195  One look at the state and 
municipal websites that direct consumers to Canadian pharmacies 
suggest that this would be a fairly easy argument to make in an 
infringement suit.196  The rather dramatic result would be liability 
 
 191 Because patents are inherently territorial, the enforcement of U.S. judgments 
overseas is notoriously thorny. See John Gladstone Mills III, A Transnational Patent 
Convention for the Acquisition and Enforcement of International Rights, 84 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 83, 90–93 (2000) (“Enforcement of judgments can be an 
arduous process even within a single nation and the enforcement of a foreign patent 
judgment presents additional tests to ensure fairness and comity in view of the large 
amounts of investment at stake.”).  International treaties have been proposed to remedy 
the situation. See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters, 77 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1065, 1065–66 (2002). 
 192 See supra notes 102–14, 118–20 and accompanying text. 
 193 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c) (2004). 
 194 See, e.g., Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1365 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Although not express in the statute, this section requires proof of intent 
to induce infringement.”). 
 195 See id.; Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 
1990). 
 196 See, e.g., Minnesota RxConnect, at http://www.state.mn.us/cgi-bin/portal/mn/jsp/-
home.do?agency=Rx (last visited Feb. 10, 2005) (home page with button stating “Click 
here to order your prescription from Canada.”). 
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for all damages resulting from the infringing acts, due to the joint 
and several nature of patent torts.197 
The liability for infringing a U.S. patent can be extreme, 
particularly when the infringement cuts into the profits of a so-
called “blockbuster” drug.198  Though patents lack the minimum 
statutory damages associated with copyrights,199 they nonetheless 
strip an infringer of damages equal to all profits lost as a result of 
the infringement.200  In the case of a pharmaceutical with a high 
U.S. price, but low foreign price—the situation importation is 
intended to address—the measure of damages could simply be the 
difference in prices.201  In other words, a government entity may 
end up paying for any savings in drug prices through an award in a 
patent infringement case.  Indeed, if export middlemen take a cut 
of the savings as predicted,202 a government entity could actually 
end up paying more for imported drugs.  Even if a patent owner 
cannot establish a lost profits case, a “reasonable royalty” is the 
minimum with which an infringer can escape;203 thus, taxpayers 
would end up subsidizing the cost of drugs at some level.  
Additionally, if the infringement is found to be willful, damages 
may be increased up to three times at the discretion of the court.204  
 
 197 See CHISUM, supra note 164, § 8:21.03[3][e]  (“The owner may also have a remedy 
against persons who induce or contribute to infringement by another . . . However, 
because such infringers are by long tradition severally as well as jointly liable, they may 
be sued separately (that is, they are not necessary parties).”) (citations omitted). 
 198 See Franco, supra note 65. 
 199 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2000). 
 200 See State Indus. v Mor-Flo Indus., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“To get 
lost profits as actual damages, the patent owner must demonstrate that there was a 
reasonable probability that, but for the infringement, it would have made the infringer’s 
sales.”). 
 201 Note that this assumes that sales made at the low foreign price would still be made at 
the high U.S. price.  For essential, maintenance drugs, this may be true, but for lifestyle 
drugs, one could argue that at least some percentage of the purchases would not have 
been made at the higher price. See Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 
F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that lost profit damages must be proven only to 
a reasonable probability). 
 202 See, e.g., HHS REPORT, supra note 95, at 67. 
 203 See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) 
(citing 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988)) (noting that the patent damages statute allows for the 
recovery of actual damages while providing for a reasonable royalty as an alternative, 
lower limit). 
 204 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). 
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Injunctive relief is also a possibility,205 though overtly restricting 
access to drugs could be a politically dangerous measure for patent 
owners to undertake. 
While the potential for crushing liability seems to bode ill for 
the future of government importation initiatives, there is an 
extremely important codicil that must be considered: state 
governments currently cannot be sued for patent infringement in 
federal court.  The Constitution’s Eleventh Amendment absolutely 
precludes such suits against states, a fact well established in patent 
jurisprudence.206  Congress has of course abrogated this broad 
constitutional immunity in other contexts,207 and the same could be 
done in the case of patents.  Indeed, in the Patent and Plant Variety 
Protection Remedy Clarification Act,208 Congress provided federal 
jurisdiction for suits against state governments for both patent and 
trademark infringement.209  However, the Supreme Court in 
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. 
College Savings Bank210 struck down that legislation, finding that 
Congress had not properly supported abrogation in cases of 
intellectual property infringement by state governments.211 
 
 205 See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000). 
 206 See, e.g., Chew v. State of California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990), superseded by 
statute as stated in Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1993); 
Jacobs Wind Electric Co. v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 919 F.2d 726, 728 (Fed. Cir. 1990), 
superseded by statute as stated in Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993). 
 207 See, e.g., Lisa M. Durham, Protection from Age Discrimination for State Employees: 
Abrogation of Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity in the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 33 GA. L. REV. 541 (1999). 
 208 Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h)–296 
(2000)). 
 209 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(h) (2000). 
 210 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
 211 Id. at 640–43 (1999) (“In enacting the Patent Remedy Act, however, Congress 
identified no pattern of patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of 
constitutional violations.  Unlike the undisputed record of racial discrimination 
confronting Congress in the voting rights cases . . . Congress came up with little evidence 
of infringing conduct on the part of the States. . . . Congress, however, barely considered 
the availability of state remedies for patent infringement and hence whether the States’ 
conduct might have amounted to a constitutional violation under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
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Since the decision in Florida Prepaid, bills have been proposed 
to abrogate state immunity for intellectual property 
infringement.212  The proposed acts seek to squarely ground the 
abrogation in the lack of remedies available in state courts.213  
Surprisingly, no measure has yet passed, but most anticipate that 
this loophole will eventually be closed.  The ever-increasing rate at 
which states take advantage of the federal patent system214 may 
spur public sentiment against the contradiction of allowing them 
continued immunity from suit.215  Significantly, for states 
interested in taking advantage of the immunity in the interim, if 
and when abrogation is reinstated, liability should be retroactive 
for all acts of infringement.216 
 
 212 See, e.g., Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2002, S. 2031, 107th 
Cong.; Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003, S. 1191, 108th Cong. 
 213 See S. 1191, 108th Cong. § 2(1) (2003). 
 214 See U.S. Colleges and Universities—Utility Patent Grants, Calendar Years 1969-
2000, Tbl. 1.B., at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/univ/asgn/table-
_1.htm (last modified May 14, 2002) (showing that patents assigned to Universities have 
increased from 82,952 in 1987 to 157,495 in 2000). 
 215 Theoretically, there may be another way to prevent state drug importation using 
federal patent laws that avoids the issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity.  The U.S. 
Customs Service may seize imports to prevent unfair trade practices if ordered to do so 
by the U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC”) in what is known as a “337 
investigation.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(i) (2000) (implemented by 19 C.F.R. § 12.39 
(2004)).  One of the primary bases underlying an ITC determination of unfair trade 
practices is importation that would infringe a valid patent. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) 
(2000).  If a patent owner files a complaint with the ITC, it should be possible for the 
Commission to make such a determination without the participation of the alleged 
infringer, rendering immunity moot.  This is because the alleged infringer is not 
technically sued; rather, the issue comes before the ITC through in rem jurisdiction over 
the imported articles. See Enercon GmbH v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 151 F.3d 1376, 1380–
83 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Kimberly Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1497, 1528–29 (2003) (noting the advantages of suing foreign entities in the 
ITC versus federal courts).  Of course, this route suffers from the same political failing as 
an injunction in patent infringement litigation, namely, that access to essential medicines 
is prevented.  Additionally, as a practical matter it could be difficult for the Customs 
Service to distinguish legal pharmaceutical imports (e.g., those not regulated by the FDA) 
from illegal ones. 
 216 Eleventh Amendment immunity is a jurisdictional issue, rather than a substantive 
defense. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 
627, 634 (1999).  In other words, state governments that infringe violate federal patent 
law, but there is simply no federal forum available for the suit.  One restraint on the 
liability of states is the limitation on damages to the six years preceding the suit. 35 
U.S.C. § 286 (2000).  If it takes longer than that to abrogate state immunity in this area, 
some acts of infringement may be untouchable. 
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Interestingly, state immunity does not completely moot the 
question of liability for government importation plans.  A long-
standing doctrine permits suit in federal court against individual 
state officers who violate federal law while acting in their official 
capacities, even when the Eleventh Amendment precludes calling 
the state itself into federal court.  The genesis of this curious 
litigation route is Ex parte Young,217 a 1908 Supreme Court case in 
which Young—the attorney general of Minnesota at the time—was 
sued to enjoin his enforcement of an unconstitutional state statute 
establishing railroad rates.218  Despite the fact that the state was 
immune from suit, the court held that an officer enforcing an act in 
violation of federal law was open to suit as a mere individual 
committing an illegal act in the state’s name.219 
The doctrine of Ex parte Young has been asserted in the 
context of patent infringement cases.  One successful example is 
the 1972 case of Hercules Inc. v. Minnesota State Highway 
Dept,220 in which a patent owner sued state highway officials for 
infringing patents on pesticide and weed control compounds.  The 
court found that an injunction prohibiting future infringement fell 
squarely within the rationale of Ex parte Young by enjoining an 
individual illegal act rather than impacting state sovereign 
immunity.221  Although the doctrine has received scant use in the 
thirty years following Hercules, its general continued viability has 
been affirmed in other contexts by very recent Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.222  Additionally, one judge on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has at least suggested, if not 
 
 217 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 218 Id.; see also Thomas, supra note 175, at 12. 
 219 Id. at 159–60. 
 220 337 F. Supp. 795 (D. Minn. 1972). 
 221 Id. at 799. 
 222 See, e.g., Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004); Verizon Md., Inc. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635 (2002); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 
521 U.S. 261 (1997).  Note that, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 
74–75 (1996), the Court limited the application of Ex parte Young when a lesser remedial 
scheme prescribed by statute would be enhanced or increased by standard federal 
injunctive remedies.  That would not appear to be the case with regard to federal patent 
law, which provides for federal injunctive relief as a discretionary remedy. See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 283 (2004). 
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endorsed, the use of the doctrine as a means of circumventing state 
immunity in patent cases.223 
Importantly, the doctrine of Ex parte Young is somewhat 
circumscribed in that it permits only prospective declaratory or 
injunctive relief against the officer, rather than compensation for 
past harm such as damages.224  Thus, the threat of such an action 
would likely not dissuade state infringement to the same degree as 
a patent infringement suit.225  Also, it appears that only illegal acts 
directly committed by a state official may be enjoined,226 which 
arguably introduces the possibility that third-party acts like 
contributory infringement or inducing others to infringe would not 
be actionable.  Although this would be a rather strained 
interpretation of “legality” under the Patent Act,227 such exclusion 
could render Ex parte Young useless in many cases.228 
An additional consideration in assessing government liability is 
the nature of the entity.  Several municipalities have expressed 
their intent to undertake their own initiatives.229  Government 
entities like cities and counties are technically subdivisions of the 
state, but act autonomously and raise their own funds through 
taxes.  The Supreme Court has therefore determined that such local 
government entities are not an arm of the state for Eleventh 
 
 223 See Xechem Int’l, Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 382 F.3d 1324, 
1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Newman, J., additional views). 
 224 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 747 (1999). 
 225 Another limitation on Ex parte Young is that it may not enlarge the remedies 
normally available by statute.  See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75-
76 (1999) (“Nevertheless, the fact that Congress chose to impose upon the State a 
liability that is significantly more limited than would be the liability imposed upon the 
state officer under Ex parte Young strongly indicates that Congress had no wish to create 
the latter [in the list of remedies available though the statute]”).  But since injunctive 
relief is available under the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000), this limitation should not 
work to preclude a patent infringement-related cause of action under the doctrine. 
 226 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908) (noting the need for a connection 
between the state official and the state’s illegal act). 
 227 A better interpretation of the Patent Act suggests that, given their specific statutory 
treatment (35 U.S.C. §§ 271(b)–(c) (2000)), inducement and contributory infringement 
are illegal acts in and of themselves and should therefore fall under Ex parte Young.  
However, it appears that the doctrine has not actually been applied in this manner. 
 228 See supra notes 176–80 and accompanying text. 
 229 See supra notes 108–11 and accompanying text. 
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Amendment immunity purposes.230  In other words, while state 
governments can avoid patent infringement liability for the time 
being, any city within the state that imports or induces the import 
of patented pharmaceuticals from another country without the 
authorization of the patent owner will be liable for all attendant 
damages.  This exposure could be sufficient to choke off local 
importation plans.  However, state-level plans could still face an 
attack on another front. 
C. The Constitution Provides an Additional Source of State and 
Municipal Liability for Intruding on Patent Rights 
Even if infringement is committed by, or under, the 
authorization of a state government, immunity from liability is not 
certain simply because access to the federal courts is denied.  
There may be an additional route for obtaining relief based on the 
fact that patents are, at base, personal property,231 a fact recognized 
under both state and federal law.232 
From this point of view, patent infringement is basically a type 
of trespass to personal property.233  In tangible property contexts, 
when a trespass to personal or real property is undertaken by a 
government entity, the infringement on personal property rights is 
viewed as an exercise of the state’s eminent domain power or 
“taking,” in which case the aggrieved property owner is due 
constitutionally mandated “just compensation.”234  The property 
owner may pursue such an action in the relevant state court.235  
 
 230 See Mt. Healthy City School District Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 
(1977) (“The bar of the Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal courts extends to States 
and state officials in appropriate circumstances . . . but does not extend to counties and 
similar municipal corporations.”). 
 231 See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000). 
 232 See CHISUM, supra note 164, § 8:21.02[1][c]. 
 233 Note that a civil action against a private party for trespass to personal or real property 
is, like patent infringement, considered a tort. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 158 (1965) [hereinafter “RESTATEMENT”] (describing liability for intentional 
intrusions on land).  This is obviously not a barrier to eminent domain actions. 
 234 See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 473 
(1973) (“‘[J]ust compensation’ means the full monetary equivalent of the property 
taken.’”) (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970)). 
 235 See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 615–16 (2001) (detailing 
plaintiff’s lawsuit in Rhode Island Superior Court for compensation based on an alleged 
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There is no reason that this basic protection of property rights 
should not extend to intangible property like patents when a 
trespass or infringement is proven.  Although compensation for 
takings may not match all of the relief a patent owner may receive 
under the Patent Act,236 the liability could be significant enough to 
thwart the state importation schemes.  Since pursing an intellectual 
property infringement claim through this route is relatively novel, a 
number of hurdles must be overcome to establish the viability of 
such a suit. 
1. Access to State Courts to Obtain Relief 
The first issue a patent owner must negotiate in pursuing a 
patent infringement case on an eminent domain theory is access to 
the relevant state court.  Federal jurisdictional statutes appear to 
give federal courts the exclusive right to hear civil actions “arising 
under any Act of Congress” in “patent, plant variety protection and 
copyright cases.”237  However, there is good reason to believe that 
this statute will not bar a state court from hearing a takings case. 
An eminent domain (or inverse condemnation action) against a 
state is not based on an act of Congress, but rather is grounded in 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.238  The 
 
regulatory taking by the state).  The recognition of this form of action has apparently 
been a gradual process for the states. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
1056–60 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing the historical evolution of eminent 
domain law in the states). 
 236 In the context of federal takings of private patent rights, the courts have restricted the 
available remedies to actual damages. See, e.g., Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 
765, 768 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[I]njunctive relief under 35 U.S.C. § 283 is not available 
to a patent owner in a § 1498 action.”) (citing Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 
958, 968 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (en banc) (“The injunctive relief of 35 U.S.C. § 283 could not be 
awarded, of course, since this court lacks the power to grant such relief.”)).  Yet another 
route besides suing the state in eminent domain would be to ask the relevant state 
legislature to pass a bill appropriating the compensation. See Jacobs Wind Elec. Co., Inc. 
v. Fla. Dept. of Transp., 919 F.2d 726, 728 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (suggesting that plaintiff 
could have sought relief from patent infringement by state in form of legislative “claims 
bill.”).  However, compensating pharmaceutical companies for the losses due to 
importation of lower priced drugs is unlikely to be popular enough to pass through the 
legislatures. 
 237 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2000). 
 238 See Seamon, supra note 9, at 1144 n.374 (“The claim would not be barred by the 
federal statute that gives federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction of cases ‘arising 
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Federal Circuit in Jacobs Wind Electric Co. v. Florida Department 
of Transportation239 recognized that distinction when it considered 
a federal court’s jurisdiction over a patent owner’s infringement 
suit against the State of Florida in view of the Eleventh 
Amendment.240  The court noted, in dicta, that the plaintiff had 
other litigation venues available such as “assert[ing] a ‘takings’ 
claim against the state under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”241  The Florida Supreme Court in the same 
litigation later confirmed that notion by holding that Florida courts 
indeed had jurisdiction over Jacobs’ patent takings claim.242  
Interestingly, the Florida court’s rationale was based on the 
determination that Congress could not have preempted actions that 
the federal courts had no jurisdiction to hear.243  Although a state’s 
jurisdiction to hear an inverse condemnation case related to a 
patent may not necessarily depend on a lack of remedy at the 
federal level, that situation does exist today as a result of Florida 
Prepaid and the lack of any action by Congress to date.244 
The corollary to the federal preemption issue is the fact that a 
state must also consent to be sued in its own courts.  The fact that a 
party may have a legitimate cause of action against a government 
entity, but no procedure for pursuing it may seem odd, but the 
ability to determine the circumstance and forum under which a 
government may be sued is recognized under the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity.245  Moreover, the recent Supreme Court 
decision in Alden v. Maine246 held that Congress cannot compel a 
 
under any Act of Congress relating to patents,’ 28 U.S.C. §1338, because the case would 
arise under the Constitution, not under the patent laws.”). 
 239 919 F.2d 726, 728 (Fed. Cir. 1990), superseded by statute as stated in Genentech, 
Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Fla. Dep’t of Trans., 626 So. 2d 1333, 1336–37 (Fla. 
1993). 
 243 Id. 
 244 See supra notes 206–11 and accompanying text. 
 245 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (“‘[I]t is inherent in the 
nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its 
consent . . . .’”) (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890)); Seamon, supra note 
9, at 1090–93. 
 246 527 U.S. 706 (1999), 
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state to open itself to a lawsuit based on a statute grounded in an 
Article I power.247  This prompts the question: Can a state refuse to 
hear a case relating to inverse condemnation of a property right 
created by the Patent Act, derived from Congress’s section eight 
enumerated powers?248 
As a starting point, it is important to recognize that one can 
distinguish between the remedial scheme outlined in the federal 
Patent Act249 and the statute’s independent creation of a property 
right.250  Although the former can be pursued only in the context of 
a specific type of litigation in federal court (i.e., an Article I-based 
case as described in Alden), the essential aspects of the property 
right can be transferred to another sovereign’s property framework.  
In fact, the courts have firmly established that matters relating to 
the ownership of patent property, including transfer and licensing, 
are exclusively a matter of state law rather than federal.251  If a 
state has a procedure for pursuing property takings cases through 
its own courts, it seems reasonable that patent property rights 
would be included.252  In fact, this treatment of patent property has 
support in court decisions from a few states,253 though most have 
 
 247 Id. at 713 (“[T]he States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the 
sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and 
which they retain today (either literally or by virtue of their admission into the Union 
upon an equal footing with the other States) except as altered by the plan of the 
Convention or certain constitutional Amendments.”). 
 248 U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
 249 35 U.S.C. §§ 283, 284 (2000). 
 250 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000). 
 251 See, e.g., Int’l Nutrition Co. v. Horphag Research Ltd., 257 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001) (“[T]the question of who owns patent rights, and on what terms, typically is a 
question exclusively for state courts and not one arising under United States patent 
laws. . . . A contractual agreement to apply French law as to ownership is just as valid as 
an agreement to apply the law of a particular state.”); Studiengesellschaft Köhle, m.b.H. 
v. Hercules, Inc., 105 F.3d 629, 632 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that proper construction of 
a patent license agreement “is a question of contract interpretation” under state law). 
 252 See 1 JULIUS L. SACHMAN & PATRICK J. ROHAN, NICHOLS’ THE LAW OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN § 2.1[2] (3d ed. 1993) (“Intangible property, such as choses in action, patent 
rights, franchises, charters, or any other form of contract are within the scope of this 
sovereign authority as fully as land or other tangible property.”). 
 253 See, e.g., Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 626 So. 2d 1333, 1336–37 
(Fla. 1993); Wilcox Indus., Inc. v. State, 607 N.E.2d 514 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992), 
dismissed, jurisdictional mot. overruled by 598 N.E.2d 1168 (Ohio 1992); see also A.C. 
Aukerman Co. v. State, 902 S.W.2d 576, 578 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (considering an 
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not addressed it.  Support can also be found in state court decisions 
regarding other types of intellectual property.254 
This still leaves open the question of whether a state can 
structure the jurisdiction of its courts to specifically refuse to hear 
an intellectual property inverse condemnation case.  The failure of 
such a case due to a lack of jurisdiction is not unprecedented.  The 
federal government was immune from suits to recover 
compensation for property takings until the passage of the Tucker 
Act in 1887255 (and from most torts until the passage of the Federal 
Tort Claims Act in 1946).256  In other intellectual property 
contexts, some state courts have been reluctant to find eminent 
domain jurisdiction.257  However, many commentators have argued 
 
eminent domain action against the state based on patent infringement, but denying it only 
because the state was not shown to have been involved in the infringing activity); Chew 
v. California, 893 F.2d 331, 336 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting that Eleventh Amendment 
immunity precludes only one avenue of recourse against a state for patent infringement), 
superseded by statute as stated in Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993); Lemelson v. Ampex Corp., 372 F. Supp. 708, 710–13 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (stating 
that state’s use of a patent constituted an eminent domain taking).  There is also vague 
support in cases regarding other intellectual property types. See, e.g., Smith v. Lutz, 149 
S.W.3d 752, 760–61 (Tex. App. 2004) (considering a plaintiff’s allegation that the 
University of Texas engaged in a taking of copyrights and trade secrets, but ultimately 
dismissing the claim as inappropriate because it was based on a failed contractual 
relationship). 
 254 See, e.g., State Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., 834 P.2d 134, 138 
(Alaska 1991) (“The companies contend that their oil well data constitute trade secrets 
protected under both the Alaska and the United States Constitutions.  We agree.”); N.J. 
State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 600 F. Supp. 606, 626 (D.N.J. 1985) (“Although 
no case has been brought to my attention determining whether an uncompensated taking 
of a trade secret would violate the State Constitution, I see no reason why the New Jersey 
Supreme Court would not take the same approach as the United States Supreme Court in 
this regard.”), aff’d in relevant part, 774 F.2d 587, 598 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 255 Ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491 (2003)); 
see, e.g., Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 169 (1894) (holding that plaintiff 
could not bring an action against the U.S. under Tucker Act for infringing plaintiff’s 
patented process); see also Seamon, supra note 9, at 1090–94. 
 256 See Hon. Leon R. Yankwich, Problems Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 9 F.R.D. 
143, 146–49 (1949) (discussing the background to the Federal Tort Claims Act soon after 
it was enacted, as well as other federal waivers of immunity, such as the Tucker Act and 
the predecessor to 28 U.S.C. § 1498). 
 257 See, e.g., Gen. Tire, Inc. v. Kepple, 917 S.W.2d 444, 454 (Tex. App. 1996) (“While 
Texas law treats trade secrets as property in some contexts, they have not been classified 
as property for the purposes of the taking clause.”), rev’d on other grounds, 970 S.W.2d 
520 (Tex. 1998). 
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that the U.S. Supreme Court in First English Evangelical Lutheran 
Church of Glendale v Los Angeles County258 strongly suggested 
that state sovereign immunity does not exist for takings cases 
because it is overridden by the just compensation requirement.259  
Even if First English cannot be read so broadly, it has been argued 
that the most reasonable interpretation of the Due Process Clause 
indeed requires states to waive sovereign immunity for inverse 
condemnation cases, despite the fact that the obligation appears to 
be asymmetric with that of the federal government.260  This due 
process obligation in the context of patent property was recently 
articulated in “additional views” submitted by Judge Newman in 
Xechem International v. University of Texas.261  Assuming the 
Supreme Court continues its recent support for enforcing due 
process obligations on the states,262 it would appear that a state 
would face an uphill battle in attempting to remove jurisdiction for 
those seeking just compensation for takings under either federal or 
state constitutions. 
2. Establishing a Compensable Taking 
A second obstacle for patent owners may result from the 
somewhat ambiguous nature of an intellectual property taking.  A 
 
 258 482 U.S. 304, 314–16 (1987). 
 259 See, e.g., Paul J. Heald & Michael L. Wells, Remedies for the Misappropriation of 
Intellectual Property by State and Municipal Governments Before and After Seminole 
Tribe: The Eleventh Amendment and Other Immunity Doctrines, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
849, 871–72 (1998); Seamon, supra note 9, at 1072 n.19 (listing several other academic 
articles that make similar assertions regarding First English). 
 260 See Seamon, supra note 9, at 1101–10. 
 261 382 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  After discussing the limitations of state immunity 
for patent infringement, Judge Newman concluded that: 
The circumstances of this case illustrate that when a state is charged with 
contravention of federal law in a way that directly affects private property, and 
if no remedy is indeed available within the state’s tribunals—whether by the 
state’s invocation of immunity or by federal preemption of the cause of 
action—there can arise an affront to the fundamentals of due process. Respect 
for the principles of federalism does not automatically immunize the state from 
due process considerations. 
Id. at 1335. 
 262 See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (upholding congressional 
abrogation of state immunity in Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act under the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
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state could attempt to avoid liability by claiming the act of 
infringement is merely regulatory in nature—a justified use of the 
state’s police powers—and  not compensable if it leaves a 
reasonable economic use of the patent property in question (a very 
likely result in the case of pharmaceutical importation takings).263  
On the other hand, if takings law as it pertains to physical 
occupations of, or interference with, tangible property is applied to 
drug importation, just compensation must be paid no matter what 
use of the property remains.264  While there is no explicit guidance 
in the case law as to which approach applies to intellectual 
property, the proper method can be derived through analogies to 
tangible property as well as the implicit treatment by the courts. 
It is well established that, in the context of real property, 
slightly different legal rules apply depending on which of two 
primary types of appropriation have occurred.  There is the open 
and notorious “physical occupation,” wherein a government entity 
physically intrudes upon a property owner’s curtilage.265  A 
government entity achieves this by taking real property (land or 
buildings) for its exclusive use on either a temporary or permanent 
basis.266  More recently, the courts have recognized that 
government regulation can effectuate a second type of taking when 
the regulation severely limits a property owner’s use of the land 
through some type of police power derived restriction.267  
 
 263 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (“We think, in short, 
that there are good reasons for our frequently expressed belief that when the owner of 
real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the 
name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has 
suffered a taking.”). 
 264 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
322–24 (1999) (“When the government physically takes possession of an interest in 
property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former 
owner, United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115 (1951), regardless of whether 
the interest that is taken constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part thereof.”). 
 265 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427–28 (1982) 
(discussing the difference between physical takings and regulatory takings, noting that 
the latter relates to use restrictions only). 
 266 See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378–79 (1945) (finding a 
taking when the government temporarily occupied a building for a public purpose); 
United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372. 374–75 (1946) (finding a taking when 
the government temporarily occupied a building under lease to another). 
 267 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. 
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Generally, the owner’s ability to exclude the physical presence of 
others—including the government—is not affected.268  Unlike 
physical occupations, regulatory takings must be quite onerous to 
be compensable.  Essentially all economically beneficial use of the 
property must be forestalled by the government regulation before 
the act is transformed from merely an exercise of police power to a 
compensable appropriation.269  The rules related to real property 
appear fairly well characterized, at least conceptually, but the 
application is not always cogent or consistent. 
The scheme for addressing government intrusions on personal 
property is similar, though the manner in which a government 
entity “occupies” such property is obviously different.  A physical 
intrusion on personal property occurs when that property is either 
temporarily confiscated, or permanently taken or destroyed.270  In 
either case, the property owner’s rights must be substantially 
affected.  Theoretically, the government can also regulate one’s 
use of personal property so strictly as to prevent reasonable future 
economic use.  However, the case law suggests that such incidents 
are rare.271  Moreover, even when the facts arguably support such 
an allegation, plaintiffs have had little success against government 
entities.272 
How does the legal structure for tangible property fit 
intellectual property rights?  As an intangible, intellectual property 
obviously cannot be physically occupied, captured or damaged 
(though it can be destroyed or eliminated).273  Additionally, since 
intellectual property rights do not include the right to use what is 
 
 268 Id. at 1044 (Blackmun, H., dissenting). 
 269 Id. 
 270 See General Motors, 323 U.S. at 383–84 (determining that compensation was owed 
for destruction or devaluation of trade fixtures—a type of personal property—during a 
temporary occupation of a building). 
 271 See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 523 (1998) (noting only one regulatory 
case involving personal property); Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. U.S., 49 Fed. Cl. 36, 46 
(2001) (failing to note more than one case of the application of regulatory takings law to 
personal property), rev’d, 379 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 272 See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). 
 273 See, e.g., DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 192–93 (Ct. 
App. 2004) (noting, in the context of the Internet, that disclosure of a trade secret 
destroys it). 
CAHOY 4/25/2005  4:19 PM 
680 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 15:623 
covered,274 regulatory intrusion would also seem to be impossible.  
But there must be some link between traditional eminent domain 
law and intellectual property rights, or the “property” 
nomenclature is misdescriptive.  The solution to this conundrum 
lies in the fact that, at base, physical intrusions on tangible 
property are nothing more than infringements on the property 
owner’s right to exclude others (including the government) from 
the property.275  Interfering with this right is the essence of a 
physical occupation, and various physical interactions are simply 
different flavors of the same cuisine.  In fact, real property takings 
have been found when a government merely prohibits the property 
owner from keeping outsiders away, even if the government makes 
no direct use of the property.276  Although intellectual property 
rights differ in what activities the owner may prevent others from 
undertaking,277 a breach of any of these rights of exclusion 
necessarily diminishes the value of the property in a similar 
fashion to a physical occupation of tangible property.278  
 
 274 While the act of invention itself “vests an inventor with a common law or ‘natural’ 
right to make, use and sell his or her invention absent conflicting patent rights in others,” 
Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991), a patent 
conveys the additional right to exclude others from making, using, selling or offering to 
sell the invention. Id. (citing Six Wheel Corp. v. Sterling Motor Truck Co., 50 F.2d 568, 
571 (9th Cir. 1931)). 
 275 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (“In this case, we hold 
that the ‘right to exclude,’ so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property 
right, falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without 
compensation.” But see Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1350 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (holding that the right to exclude spotted owls, as eliminated by government 
regulation, is not a permanent physical occupation), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 906 (2003). 
 276 See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176 (finding that a servitude on landowner’s navigable 
waterway took the landowner’s right to exclude, “one of the most essential sticks in the 
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property”). 
 277 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), (g) (2003). 
 278 Note that courts have found this to be the case even if minimal monetary damages 
accrue. See Polymer Techs., Inc. v. Bridwell, 103 F.3d 970, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“The 
right to exclude others from a specific market, no matter how large or small that market, 
is an essential element of the patent right.  As we have stated, ‘because the principal 
value of a patent is its statutory right to exclude, the nature of the patent grant weighs 
against holding that monetary damages will always suffice to make the patentee 
whole.’”) (citing Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1456–57 (Fed. Cir. 
1988)). 
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Therefore, infringement of an intellectual property owner’s rights 
of exclusion should be treated as a physical occupation.279 
Another way to conceptualize the nature of government takings 
of intellectual property is to consider the parallels between the 
government acts that constitute takings, and the acts of private 
parties that violate an owner’s rights.  Physical takings of tangible 
property are akin to trespass to real or personal property.280  Both 
involve intentional acts281 that lead to the breaching of one’s 
property boundaries.  Tangible takings and trespass are largely co-
extensive.282  The same should be true of intellectual property.  In 
other words, the same acts that would constitute the parallel to 
trespass—infringement—should theoretically constitute a 
taking.283 
Although a definitive connection between tangible and 
intangible takings is not laid out in either state or federal statutory 
law, there is a relatively clear delineation in the common law of the 
 
 279 As straightforward as this analysis may seem, creating a proper analogy for 
intellectual property takings is no simple task.  If the government intrusion is like a 
physical taking, compensation is relatively automatic, and the degree of the intrusion is a 
question relevant for determining damages only.  However, if government intrusion is 
like a regulatory takings, a much more complicated assessment must be undertaken. See 
Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992) (“The first category of cases [physical 
taking] requires courts to apply a clear rule; the second [regulatory taking] necessarily 
entails complex factual assessments of the purposes and economic effects of government 
actions.”). 
 280 Also known as “trespass to chattels.” 
 281 Trespass to land and chattels are considered “intentional torts.” See Sheehan v. 
United States, 896 F.2d 1168, 1172 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that some intentional torts 
like trespass are not excluded from the Federal Torts Claims Act).  This means that the 
act undertaken was intentional knowing that certain harm is substantially certain to result. 
See W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS §§ 13, 14 (5th ed. 1984).  
One need not have intended to “trespass.” 
 282 The exception may be where the government trespass/taking is transitory and caused 
by actions removed from the property (such as causing a flood). See Sanguinetti v. United 
States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924) (to be a taking, flooding must “constitute an actual, 
permanent invasion of the land, amounting to an appropriation of, and not merely an 
injury to, the property”); United States v. Kan. City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 809–10 
(1950). 
 283 See RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN 35–36 (1985).  Epstein draws parallels between private tort and eminent domain 
law, and states that the relevant question in determining the existence of a taking is: 
“Would the government action be treated as a taking of private property if it had been 
performed by some private party?  If so, there is a taking of private property . . . .” Id. 
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most relevant judicial fora.  Recent cases involving patent takings 
by the federal government are in line with the analogy to physical 
takings due to the application of compensation without proceeding 
through a regulatory analysis.284  In fact, most court decisions fail 
to address the issue, simply referring to the government taking or 
infringement as an eminent domain exercise.  Conversely, it is 
perhaps more instructive that no courts have found copyright or 
patent takings to be “regulatory takings.”  The physical occupation 
scheme intuitively seems most appropriate. 
If there is any argument to be made for the application of a 
regulatory takings scheme, it would likely be based in the Supreme 
Court’s rather curious decision in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto.285  In 
that case, the Court considered Monsanto’s allegation that the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency disclosed and thus destroyed 
trade secret information that Monsanto provided to the agency in 
confidence as part of its regulatory obligation.286  While finding 
that such an effect on even an intangible property right constituted 
a Fifth Amendment taking, the Court also stated that the 
determination as to whether a taking occurred must consider 
whether “a governmental action has gone beyond ‘regulation’” by 
looking to such factors as “the character of the governmental 
action, its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable 
investment-backed expectations.”287  In other words, the Court 
applied a regulatory takings analysis.  Importantly, the Court did 
not suggest that such a test should be exclusively employed in all 
cases, or even that it applied to all types of intellectual property.288  
However, it does stand out as the Supreme Court’s only decision 
on the treatment of such intangible takings.  Considering the 
Federal Circuit’s handling of patent takings, the closer analogy to 
tangible property physical occupations, and the openings left in 
Ruckelshaus in terms of available legal theory, is reasonable to 
treat the case as distinguishable or inapplicable.  This approach has 
 
 284 See, e.g., Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States, 113 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  
However, it should be recognized that the government infringement statute is written to 
compensate automatically, so a conclusion is hard to draw. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2000). 
 285 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
 286 Id. at 1000–01. 
 287 Id. at 1005. 
 288 Id. 
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been acknowledged in the context of litigation and academic 
theory.289 
3. “Just Compensation” for Patent Infringement 
If states are, in fact, liable in their own courts under a takings 
theory, what is the appropriate measure of just compensation?  
Though this may appear to be a secondary issue compared to the 
establishment of liability, it is in many ways just as important: a 
patent property right requiring a minor licensing fee for an 
importation taking is a mere road bump, whereas one that 
implicates compensation for all of the patentee’s losses is a 
veritable brick wall.  As with the compensation trigger discussed 
above, the answer is not entirely clear due to the nature of this type 
of intellectual property taking.  If an entire patent right is 
appropriated or eliminated by the state, an accounting method 
similar to that used for the sale of the intellectual property would 
reasonably be employed to determine the value of the property 
lost.290  However, a taking that infringes only part of the right, 
while leaving the remainder, is less straight forward.  Again, an 
analogy to patent infringement actions provides the best guidance. 
The federal Patent Act is fairly clear in outlining the source of 
remedies for private party infringement, if not the precise method 
of calculation.291  However, it does not necessarily follow that all 
of these measures are available in a suit against a government 
entity.  In fact, to the extent that certain remedies are intended to 
punish an infringer for tortious behavior like willfulness,292 they 
would seem in conflict with the principles of the Fifth and 
 
 289 See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 688, 706 (2003) (“[A]s [Ruckelshaus 
v.] Monsanto does not preclude the recognition of other forms of takings, Plaintiff could 
allege a taking of a different sort from either [regulatory taking or physical taking] 
categories.”); Cotter, supra note 9, at 558–65 (arguing that there are strong reasons for 
limiting Ruckelshaus to its facts and finding that unauthorized government use of 
intellectual property always effectuates a taking). 
 290 See GORDON V. SMITH & RUSSELL L. PARR, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
& INTANGIBLE ASSETS 170 (3d ed. 2000) (“The income approach is best suited for the 
appraisal of . . . patents, trademarks, and copyrights . . . .”). 
 291 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 281–85 (2000). 
 292 See id. § 284 (stating that a damages award may be increased up to three times the 
actual amount at the discretion of the court). 
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Fourteenth Amendments, which do not seek to dissuade the 
intentional use of eminent domain powers so long as just 
compensation is paid.293  Nevertheless, there are parallels between 
some aspects of patent infringement damages and eminent domain. 
In eminent domain jurisprudence, the object of compensation is 
to provide the property owner with the “fair market value” of the 
property taken.294  While it is understood that this may not 
compensate the property owner to complete indifference (as the 
complete right to exclude can never be reconstructed), the intent is 
to put the owner in the same position as existed before the 
taking.295  Similarly, the basic forms of damages available under 
the Patent Act are intended to compensate the patent owner for the 
effects of the infringement.  If it can be shown, with reasonable 
probability, that a patent owner lost sales due to infringement, the 
profits from those sales can be obtained to compensate the owner 
to indifference.296  Alternatively, if the patent owner cannot 
demonstrate lost profits, a reasonable royalty guarantees some 
compensation for the breach of the right to exclude others from the 
invention.297 
While it seems logical to use the existing lost profits and 
reasonable royalty framework to measure eminent domain 
 
 293 See Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 969–79 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (en banc) 
(“An aggrieved party is entitled to receive only reasonable and entire compensation, not 
more than that . . . . Unlike his counterpart in a private infringement suit, he is not entitled 
to be the recipient of increased damages heaped on other parties as punishment or 
deterrence.”) (citations omitted). 
 294 City of New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 61 (1915) (“But what the owner is entitled to 
is the value of the property taken, and that means what it fairly may be believed that a 
purchaser in fair market conditions would have given for it in fact . . . .”); see also United 
States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970). 
 295 Reynolds, 397 U.S. at 16; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 283, at 182 (“In principle the 
ideal solution is to leave the individual owner in a position of indifference between the 
taking by the government and retention of the property.”). 
 296 See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964) 
(plurality opinion) (The statutory measure of damages is “the difference between [the 
patent owner’s] pecuniary condition after the infringement, and what his condition would 
have been if the infringement had not occurred.”); accord Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. 
Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 297 See State Indus. v Mor-Flo Indus., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (award of 
damages may be split between lost profits as actual damages to the extent they are proven 
and a reasonable royalty for the remainder). 
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compensation, not everyone agrees.  In particular, the government 
has argued in the course of several federal patent takings cases that 
a reasonable royalty is generally all that is required.298  This has 
been echoed by commentators299 as well as a few early court 
decisions.300  According to this line of reasoning, if lost profits are 
ever to be awarded, a plaintiff must demonstrate their 
appropriateness in accordance with a more difficult to achieve 
“clear and convincing” standard of proof.301  However, a recent 
decision from the Federal Circuit in Gargoyles, Inc. v. United 
States302 casts doubt on the distinction between eminent domain 
compensation and patent damages by suggesting that the latter is 
applicable in its current form.303  Since the matter has yet to be 
firmly resolved,304 state governments would be wise to consider 
the worst case scenario of lost profits in their risk assessments. 
If state governments are on the hook for lost profits damages in 
many importation cases, the damages may well preclude the 
viability of the programs.  As described above, because the 
measure of damages could be the difference in the U.S. sales price 
versus the foreign price, it may be a zero sum (or worse) game.  
 
 298 See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(emphasis added). 
 299 See, e.g., Lionel Marks Lavenue, Patent Infringement Against the United States and 
Government Contractors Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 in the United States Court of Federal 
Claims, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 389 (1995). But see David M. Schlitz & Richard J. McGrath, 
Patent Infringement Claims Against the United States Government, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 351, 
365 (2000) (Concluding that lost profits should be recoverable in many more cases than 
most people realize, the authors observe that “there are potentially large rewards in 
meritorious suits against the government, which for the most part have not been 
pursued.”). 
 300 See, e.g., Cahoy, supra note 7, at 155–61 (reviewing several cases from the Federal 
Claims Court and the Federal Circuit that seem to indicate a preference for a reasonable 
royalty in § 1498 damages assessments). 
 301 See Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 348–49 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (“But even 
if we assume that lost profits is still a viable measure of recovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, 
we cannot adopt that standard in this case because it has not been sufficiently shown by 
clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff . . . would have made and kept the profits it 
now demands.”). 
 302 113 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 303 Id. at 1576 (“We also note that the announcement of the ‘strictest proof’ standard in 
Tektronix is supported only by general references to the Fifth Amendment and the court’s 
reticence to award lost profits against the government . . . .”). 
 304 See Cahoy, supra note 135, at 160. 
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The barrier provided by constitutional takings law may be, in 
effect, insurmountable. 
D. The Impact of the Constitution on Federal Liability is in Flux 
In view of the problems facing private entities, as well as state 
and municipal drug importation programs, one might assume that 
the federal government would step in as a player.  Although its 
current position has been to discourage drug importation and it is 
currently poised to do no more than lightly regulate imports,305 the 
government could become a more active participant.  For example, 
an administrative agency such as Health and Human Services 
could engage in active importation, or at least actively facilitate the 
importation by private parties through Web portals and other 
directing resources.  At the very least, it could do so for 
government-funded purchases through programs like Medicare.306  
Of course, the federal government can also be liable for infringing 
patents, even though it is the sovereign source of the grant.307  
Would this effectively preclude this importation route as well?  
Curiously, the answer depends on unsettled law regarding whether 
a plaintiff has the right to pursue a remedy for this particular type 
of infringement. 
Since 1910, patent owners have had an explicit right of action 
against the federal government if it is found to have “used or 
manufactured [a patented invention] by or for the United States 
without license of the thereof or lawful right to use of manufacture 
the same.”308  This right, detailed in the U.S. Code, provides a 
method for obtaining compensation based on either direct 
government use or the government’s authorization of another’s 
 
 305 See Rowland, supra note 4. 
 306 See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 307 See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000). 
 308 That predecessor statute to § 1498 was enacted in 1910, and it contained essentially 
the same language as the current version with respect to rights infringed and 
compensation required. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851, amended by Act of 
July 1, 1918, ch. 114, 40 Stat. 705.  The prior statute was originally codified as part of the 
Patent Act at 35 U.S.C. § 68 (1940), and reorganized as § 1498 of Title 28 in 1948. Act 
of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 941. 
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use.309  While the statute uses neither the phrase “infringement” 
nor “taking,” it appears to bridge the gap between the two concepts 
by providing for liability for informal and inadvertent intellectual 
property infringements, while using language similar to the 
Constitution in articulating the remedy for unlawful use of 
inventions.310 
Despite the constitutional overtones in § 1498, the federal 
government has occasionally argued that it does not actually 
exercise eminent domain power over patents when it intrudes on 
the rights of the owner.  Rather, the government contends that it 
actually exercises a license option that is included within the 
original patent grant.311  A few courts have entertained this notion, 
most particularly the trial-level United States Court of Federal 
Claims in the case of De Graffenried v. United States,312 which 
stated that the government has a statutory right to use all patented 
inventions.313  However, more recent decisions from the Federal 
 
 309 See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000) (“Whenever an invention described in and covered 
by a patent of the United States is used or manufactured by or for the United States 
without license of the owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the 
owner’s remedy shall be by action against the United States in the United States Court of 
Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use 
and manufacture. . . . For the purposes of this section, the use or manufacture of an 
invention described in and covered by a patent of the United States by a contractor, a 
subcontractor, or any person, firm, or corporation for the Government and with the 
authorization or consent of the Government, shall be construed as use or manufacture for 
the United States.”). 
 310 See id. 
 311 See, e.g., Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 688, 692 (2003) (reviewing U.S. 
government’s argument that § 1498 cases are not infringements but merely the exercise 
of a type of inherent licensing authority on the part of the government).  In effect, this 
would be a compulsory license.  In more specific contexts, the federal government does 
retain recognized compulsory licensing rights. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–11 (2000) (Bayh-
Dole Act provisions that give private parties the right to own patents in federally-funded 
inventions, but reserves in the federal government a nonexclusive, nontransferable, 
irrevocable, paid-up license for the invention to practice it or have it practiced for or on 
the government’s behalf throughout the world); 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (2000) (providing for 
compulsory licensing of patents having “primary importance in the production or 
utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy”); 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2000) 
(providing for compulsory licensing of patents necessary to enable any person to comply 
with the implementation of Clean Air Act requirements). 
 312 29 Fed. Cl. 384 (1993). 
 313 Id. at 387–88 (“[T]he government does not have to resort to exercising its sovereign 
power of eminent domain to utilize a patent owner’s patented invention because the 
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Circuit as well as other opinions from the Claims Court suggest 
that this analysis is erroneous.314  Additionally, it has been noted 
that if this theory were true, jurisdiction for compensation 
grounded in the “unlawful” use or manufacture of a patented 
invention would be nonsensical; all use would theoretically be 
lawful.315  This is logically inconsistent with the legislative intent 
in providing such a mechanism for plaintiffs. 
As a straightforward reading suggests, § 1498 has a number of 
limitations that would specifically impact the importation debate.  
First and foremost, the statute does not provide for liability for 
contributory infringement/takings or inducement of another’s 
infringement.316  Only acts by or under the authority of the 
government are covered.317  More importantly, the statute appears 
to cover only the acts of direct infringement that were recognized 
at the time the statute was first enacted in 1910.  Since then, the 
Patent Act has evolved to contain additional rights, and it has been 
found that these rights were not automatically incorporated into § 
 
statutory framework that defines a patent owner’s property rights gives the government 
the authority to use all patented inventions.”). 
 314 See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(recovery is based on eminent domain); Standard Mfg. Co. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 
748, 756 (1999) (“Use by the government of a patented invention without an express 
license from the patentee is properly viewed as a taking of property under the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution through the government’s exercise of its power of 
eminent domain.”); Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 967 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (en 
banc) (“This court has traditionally searched the law of eminent domain for legal 
precedents and principles to apply in determining the ‘reasonable and entire 
compensation’ to be granted in a valid infringement action against the government.”); 
Calhoun v. United States, 453 F.2d 1385, 1391 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (“The theory underlying a 
patent suit in this court pursuant to [§ 1498] is that the Government, when a patent device 
or invention is made or used by or for the United States, ipso facto takes by eminent 
domain a compulsory compensable license in the patent; the patentee obtains his Fifth 
Amendment just compensation for that taking through his action here under § 1498.”). 
 315 See Zoltek Corp., 58 Fed. Cl. at 700. 
 316 Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States, 113 F.3d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he 
government has not waived sovereign immunity for collateral acts like inducement and 
contributory infringement.”); Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 768 n.3 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984) (“Further, the Government can only be sued for any direct infringement of a 
patent (35 U.S.C. § 271(a)), and not for inducing infringement by another (section 
271(b)) or for contributory infringement (section 271(c)).”). 
 317 Decca Ltd. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1156, 1167 (Ct. Cl. 1980). 
CAHOY 4/25/2005  4:19 PM 
2005] PROPERTY BARRIERS TO PHARMACEUTICAL IMPORTATION 689 
1498.318  For example, the right to exclude imports, added in to the 
Patent Act in 1994, cannot be the basis of a § 1498 claim.319 
In view of the § 1498 limitations, one could imagine a 
government program to purchase and distribute (or even sell) 
imported pharmaceuticals that would not infringe a patent owner’s 
rights under the statute.  At the very least, it could provide a 
significant negotiating tool that drives down prices.  All of this, of 
course, is premised on the notion that § 1498 provides the 
exclusive means for obtaining relief for U.S. government patent 
takings.  A recent case has brought this into question by 
concluding that a plaintiff’s right to receive compensation may not 
be so limited.320 
The logic for looking outside of §1498 starts from the 
proposition that patents are personal property rights and 
government infringement is a type of taking.321  This, in turn, 
suggests that the same jurisdiction implicated to resolve disputes 
regarding tangible property should apply to intellectual property.  
Specifically, since the end of the Nineteenth Century, plaintiffs 
have been able to pursue a remedy against the federal government 
under the Tucker Acts.  The so-called Little Tucker Act is reserved 
for cases that amount to less than $10,000 and confers concurrent 
original jurisdiction in federal district courts and the Court of 
Federal Claims.322  The Big Tucker Act323 concerns greater 
monetary amounts and confers exclusive jurisdiction in the Court 
of Federal Claims.324  Both statutes give their respective federal 
courts the ability to “render judgment upon any claim against the 
United States founded . . . upon the Constitution.”325  Among the 
 
 318 Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 829, 837 (2002) (“Because nothing in the 
legislative history indicates that Congress intended for the meaning and effect of section 
1498 to change in congruence with changes in 35 U.S.C. § 271, the Court is constrained 
to hold that section 1498 does not apply to all forms of direct infringement as currently 
defined in 35 U.S.C. § 271.”). 
 319 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465, § 532, 108 Stat. 4809, 4983 
(1994). 
 320 Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 688 (2003), discussed in detail infra. 
 321 See supra notes 271–79 and accompanying text. 
 322 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2000); see also Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 12 (1990). 
 323 Hereinafter, both Acts will be collectively referred to as “the Tucker Act.” 
 324 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2001); see also Preseault, 494 U.S. at 12. 
 325 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491 (2001). 
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recognized types of claims founded on the Constitution are Fifth 
Amendment-based takings of property.326  If patent takings fit into 
this category, this is no reason why Tucker Act jurisdiction should 
not apply. 
The importance of allowing patent plaintiffs to use the Tucker 
Act is that the jurisdiction is bounded only by constitutional 
liability.  This would extend to all aspects of the property right as 
opposed to a few specific articulations; the Tucker Act should 
cover what has been left out of § 1498.  However, there is a bit of a 
legal puzzle concerning the integration of § 1498 and the Tucker 
Act that complicates the analysis.  The Tucker Act was passed 
many years before the first iteration of § 1498.327  How can its 
coverage be broader and inclusive of a later-enacted statute?  In 
other words, did § 1498 impliedly supersede and eliminate some 
jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, or was § 1498 simply redundant 
and unnecessary?  If the latter is the case, the federal government 
cannot escape liability for direct pharmaceutical importation or 
sales on grounds of sovereign immunity. 
To put this issue in perspective, one must take a trip back in 
time to the Nineteenth Century when the Tucker Act was passed.  
Even at that point in history, it is clear that courts and legislators 
believed that intellectual property rights like patents should be 
treated like any other type of property, including in terms of 
eminent domain law.  For example, in the 1881 case of James v. 
Campbell,328 the Supreme Court noted: 
That the government of the United States when it grants 
letters-patent for a new invention or discovery in the arts, 
confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in the 
 
 326 See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267 (1946) (“If there is a taking, the 
claim is ‘founded upon the Constitution’ and within the jurisdiction of the [Court of 
Federal Claims] to hear and determine.”). 
 327 See ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 
U.S.C., but primarily in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1941); Gregory C. Sisk, The Tapestry 
Unravels: Sovereign Immunity and Money Claims Against the United States, 71 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 602, 606–11 (2003) (“Prior to 1855, individuals with contract or other 
monetary claims against the federal government were barred by sovereign immunity from 
seeking redress in court and thus were left to petition Congress to enact legislation—in 
the form of ‘private bills’—appropriating funds to pay those claims.”). 
 328 104 U.S. 356 (1881). 
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patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used by 
the government itself, without just compensation, any more 
than it can appropriate or use without compensation land 
which has been patented to a private purchaser, we have no 
doubt.329 
When the Tucker Act was enacted in 1887, one would think it 
would be read to encompass any taking of property rights, 
including one involving patents.  But in a strange and contradictory 
move, in 1894, the Supreme Court declared in Schillinger v. 
United States330 that the unauthorized use of a patent sounded in 
tort rather than eminent domain, and plaintiffs had no recourse 
through the Tucker Act.331  This effectively put intellectual 
property into a different category from tangible property.  
Congress enacted the predecessor statute to § 1498 specifically in 
response to Schillinger in order to provide jurisdiction for 
government patent infringement “torts.”332  Confusingly, Congress 
apparently believed this to be justified and necessary in 
consideration of federal government’s responsibilities under the 
Fifth Amendment.333  Regardless, as of 1910, patent owners could 
only use the specific jurisdictional statute enacted by Congress to 
obtain relief. 
The law became murkier following the Supreme Court’s 
subsequent decision in Crozier v. Fried Krupp 
Aktiengesellschaft.334  In that case, which related to the U.S. 
Army’s unauthorized use of a patent on artillery design, the Court 
interpreted and considered the application of § 1498’s predecessor 
 
 329 Id. at 357–58. 
 330 155 U.S. 163 (1894). 
 331 Id. at 168–69 (“It is true also that to jurisdiction over claims founded ‘upon any 
contract, express or implied, with the government of the United States,’ is added 
jurisdiction over claims ‘for damages, liquidated or unliquidated,’ but this grant is limited 
by the provision ‘in cases not sounding in tort.’”). 
 332 H.R. Rep. No. 1288, at 3 (1910) (report accompanying the bill which became the 
predecessor statute to § 1498) (“Our only purpose is to extend the jurisdiction of that 
court so that it may entertain suits and award compensation to the owners of patents in 
cases where the use of the invention by the United States is unauthorized and unlawful; in 
short, to give the court in patent cases, in addition to the jurisdiction it now has in matters 
of contract, jurisdiction in cases of tort.”). 
 333 Id. at 2–3. 
 334 224 U.S. 290 (1912). 
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shortly after it was enacted.  Following a discussion of Schillinger 
that noted its denial of tort jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, the 
Court held that the new statute effectively filled this gap.335  
However, the Court went on to specifically describe the 
government’s unauthorized use or manufacture of an invention as 
an act of eminent domain as opposed to a tort.336  The Court 
remarked that the statute’s clear intent was to provide a remedy for 
takings.337  The Crozier decision appears to merge the concepts of 
infringement and eminent domain in the context of patent disputes.  
Though it did not suggest Tucker Act jurisdiction was available in 
such a case, it was not ruled out either. 
In 2003, Chief Judge Damich of the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims considered the availability of remedies outside of the § 
1498 structure in Zoltek Corp. v. United States.338  Zoltek sued the 
U.S. government for infringing/taking its patent rights relating to a 
process for manufacturing silicon carbide fiber sheets used in 
fighter aircraft.339  The government allegedly imported fibers 
manufactured in a foreign country, which would violate Zoltek’s 
rights under a specific provision of the patent act.340  Because this 
relatively recent addition to U.S. patent rights was not incorporated 
into § 1498, the court, in an earlier decision, determined that 
compensation could not be obtained through this statute.341  
However, Zoltek contended that the act of importation was 
nonetheless a taking of property, cognizable under the broader 
 
 335 Id. at 303–07. 
 336 Id. at 305–07. 
 337 Id at 307 (“[W]e think there is no room for doubt that the statute makes full and 
adequate provision for the exercise of the power of eminent domain for which, 
considered in its final analysis, it was the purpose of the statute to provide.”). 
 338 58 Fed. Cl. 688 (2003). 
 339 Id. at 689. 
 340 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2003) (“Whoever without authority imports into the United 
States or offers to sell, sells, or uses within the United States a product which is made by 
a process patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer, if the importation, 
offer to sell, sale, or use of the product occurs during the term of such process 
patent. . . .”). 
 341 Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 829, 837 (2002) (“Because nothing in the 
legislative history indicates that Congress intended for the meaning and effect of section 
1498 to change in congruence with changes in 35 U.S.C. § 271, the Court is constrained 
to hold that section 1498 does not apply to all forms of direct infringement as currently 
defined in 35 U.S.C. § 271.”). 
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Tucker Act.  In a decision involving some delicate legal 
maneuvering, the court agreed.342 
The basis of the court’s decision was that Crozier overruled 
Schillinger’s narrow interpretation of the Tucker Act.343  The court 
determined that Crozier held government patent infringement to be 
an act of eminent domain, and that the predecessor to § 1498 was a 
remedial measure necessary only during those intervening years 
following Schillinger.344  Despite the current redundancy of § 
1498, the court found that it could be integrated with the Tucker 
Act by allowing the latter to extend jurisdiction to acts of 
infringement not covered under the former.345  The court noted that 
remedies for both cases would be restricted to those described 
under § 1498 (which, if based on eminent domain, should not be 
different than those available under the Tucker Act).346 
The analysis in Zoltek could be a bit harder to reconcile in 
consideration of Congress’s clear beliefs throughout the Twentieth 
Century, a period when it enacted not only the predecessor statute 
to § 1498, but also an amendment that provided jurisdiction for 
copyright infringement/takings.347  The copyright amendment was 
added much more recently, in 1960, and it is clear from the 
legislative history of that move that Congress believed that 
jurisdiction was not otherwise available.348  Thus, to follow the 
 
 342 Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 688, 704 (2003). 
 343 Id. at 702 (“Thus, Crozier effectively overruled Schillinger sub silentio and 
reinstated the theory of James v. Campbell ‘[t]hat the government of the United States 
when it grants letters-patent for a new invention or discovery in the arts, confers upon the 
patentee an exclusive property in the patented invention which cannot be appropriated or 
used by the government itself, without just compensation, any more than it can 
appropriate or use without compensation land which has been patented to a private 
purchaser, we have no doubt.’”) (quoting James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357–58 
(1881)). 
 344 Id. at 700–02. 
 345 Id. at 702–03 (“Thus, regarding rights created by the Patent Act other than use or 
manufacture, the Tucker Act can provide jurisdiction to this Court without conflicting 
with § 1498.”). 
 346 Id. at 704. 
 347 Pub. L. 86-726, §§ 1, 4, 74 Stat. 855, 856 (1960) (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1498(c) 
(2000)). 
 348 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 1877, at 3 (1960): 
When the Government deliberately publishes a copyrighted article, without 
obtaining the prior consent of the copyright proprietor, the general assumption 
CAHOY 4/25/2005  4:19 PM 
694 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 15:623 
reasoning of Zoltek, one must accept that Congress was so 
mistaken regarding Tucker Act jurisdiction that it enacted two 
separate, completely unnecessary statutes.  If so, it is a little 
surprising that no court has raised the issue until the turn of this 
century. 
Despite the prior confusion surrounding intellectual property 
and eminent domain law, the most reasonable position is that 
adopted by the Zoltek court.  Odd as it may seem, it appears that 
both Congress and the Supreme Court have been periodically 
confused as to the relationship between property torts and 
takings.349  The fact is, as described above,350 they are not different 
in nature, but only in context.  A physical intrusion on private 
property, violating the owner’s right to exclude, is a tort when it 
occurs between two private individuals.351  However, when the 
trespasser is a government entity, the very same infringement may 
be an act of inverse condemnation based on eminent domain 
powers.352  This is entirely clear in the law concerning tangible 
property, but for some reason has become muddled when 
intellectual property is involved. 
 
would be that the holder, pursuant to the principles of “just compensation” 
under the Fifth Amendment of our Constitution should be entitled to an action 
against the Government for infringement.  Yet no such infringement cases have 
been reported so far as this committee can determine.  The reason appears to be 
that the Government, under still another established concept, i.e., “sovereign 
immunity,” must consent to be sued for this particular type of wrong, and as yet 
has not so consented. 
 349 See, e.g., id.; Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 169 (1894).  It is interesting 
to note that, in the Senate Report on the copyright amendment to § 1498, the belief that 
the federal government enjoyed immunity from copyright suits appears to be based 
largely on the empirical fact that none had been attempted, rather than a thoughtful legal 
analysis. S. REP. NO. 1877, at 3; see supra note 348. 
 350 See supra Part IV.C.2. 
 351 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 233, § 158; KEETON ET AL., supra note 281, §§ 13, 14. 
 352 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982) 
(drawing parallels between the special kind of damage a property owner incurs when a 
stranger physically invades his or her property, and the government’s obligations under 
the Fifth Amendment); Drury v. United States, 902 F. Supp. 107, 110 (E.D. La. 1995); 
Palm v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 512, 516 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (stating that “because of 
this gray area, the same set of facts may, under certain circumstances, constitute viable 
claims under both legal theories”), aff’d sub. nom. Bartleson v. United States, 96 F.3d 
1270 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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Some commentators have argued that there is a distinction, but 
it is not tort law versus eminent domain, but rather non-intentional 
torts versus authorized acts of intrusion.353  Patent infringement is 
generally recognized as an unintentional tort,354 whereas acts of 
eminent domain must occur with the authority of the sovereign to 
be constitutional.355  In truth, referring to patent infringement as a 
no-intent harm is probably an artifact of some early ill-reasoning—
it could be argued that patent infringement requires general intent 
(as opposed to specific intent) in the same way that trespass to 
personal property or chattels does356—but this notion exists in the 
law nonetheless.  However, even if one may be “strictly liable” for 
patent infringement without any intent,357 many infringers are well 
aware of the implications of their acts.358  And to the extent a 
patent infringement/taking is intentional (such as importing a 
pharmaceutical explicitly covered by a patent)359 there would seem 
 
 353 See, e.g., Jed Silversmith, Takings, Torts & Turmoil: Reviewing the Authority 
Requirement of the Just Compensation Clause, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 359, 389–
94 (2001). 
 354 See, e.g., Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(Rader, J., concurring) (“Similarly, because intent is irrelevant to patent infringement, an 
experimental use excuse cannot survive.”); Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 
(Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 355 See Silversmith, supra note 353, at 368–72. 
 356 RESTATEMENT, supra note 233, § 217(b) (“A trespass to a chattel may be committed 
by intentionally . . . using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of 
another . . . .”); id. § 158(a) (“One is subject to liability to another for trespass, 
irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest of the 
other, if he intentionally . . . enters land in the possession of the other. . . .”). 
 357 See, e.g., Jurgens, 80 F.3d at 1570 n.2 (“Infringement itself, however, is a strict 
liability offense . . . .”). 
 358 This is the primary reason that courts enhance damages as permitted by 35 U.S.C. § 
284. See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“While no 
statutory standard dictates the circumstances under which the district court may exercise 
its discretion, this court has approved such awards where the infringer acted in wanton 
disregard of the patentee’s patent rights, that is, where the infringement is willful.”). 
 359 Information regarding which patents, if any, a manufacturer believes cover a 
particular drug is publicly available—now even through the Internet—via the FDA’s 
Orange Book. See Electric Orange Book, supra note 26.  While knowledge of a patent is 
not, in and of itself, enough to create a finding of willfulness, it does obligate a party to 
investigate further the potential for infringement. See Comark Communications, Inc. v. 
Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  The Federal Circuit recently 
addressed the obligation to investigate potential infringement, affirming the “affirmative 
duty of due care to avoid infringement,” but eliminating the negative inference for not 
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to be no basis for distinguishing between eminent domain takings 
and private infringement (except in terms of remedies).  Thus, in 
the current context, this distinction is not important. 
The liability for direct federal government involvement in 
importation appears to substantially lessen the attractiveness of this 
option.  In combination with the barriers facing states and 
municipalities, such large scale programs to ensure safety follows 
low prices may be foreclosed.  Of course, the foregoing analysis 
addresses existing law at it affects importation.  However, one 
could reasonably ask, if the legal rights afforded pharmaceutical 
patent owners present such daunting liability concerns for 
importers, why not just change the law?  Indeed, Congress is 
considering bills that would do just this.  However, the 
Constitution ensures that such measures are not so easily enacted. 
IV. A CATCH-22: CONSTITUTIONAL ROADBLOCKS IN REVISING 
PATENT RIGHTS TO PERMIT IMPORTATION 
A revision of the current rules could be accomplished by 
relatively simple legislative action.  Of course, when established 
property rights are limited or eliminated by Congress, there are 
constitutional hurdles that must be addressed for such changes in 
the law to stand.  In the case of patent property rights on important 
pharmaceuticals, it appears that the benefits of legal change would 
either be offset by the costs, or delayed for an intolerable amount 
of time.  A review of current legislative proposals suggests that this 
may be an intractable issue that Congress cannot simply draft 
away. 
A. Legislation that Negatively Impacts Established Property 
Rights 
Because the boundaries of the patent right are defined by the 
Patent Act’s infringement provision360 as well as a few common 
law rules such as national exhaustion, Congress can eliminate an 
 
seeking the advice of outside counsel. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzpahrzeuge 
GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1345–47 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 360 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000). 
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unwanted category of infringement very directly.  In the case of 
international exhaustion, the legislature could simply rewrite the 
statute to overrule Jazz Photo and impose exhaustion following an 
authorized international sale.  Such a revision could even be 
targeted to a specific field, such as pharmaceuticals.  How this is 
accomplished with respect to existing property rights, however, 
determines whether such a revision will be upheld, or declared 
unconstitutional. 
1. Constitutional Obstacles to Revising Property Rights 
Although extensions rather than reductions of patent rights 
have typically been the rule over recent years,361 rights have been 
explicitly excised at times.  In many cases, reductions are coupled 
with extensions, and the net effect of a particular law is a bit 
unclear.  For example, provisions in 1984’s Hatch-Waxman Act 
that resulted in the loss of a pharmaceutical patent owner’s right to 
sue infringers for using the patented invention to conduct research 
in preparation for a FDA application362 were arguably offset by the 
patent owner’s ability to obtain extensions of patent rights for 
regulatory delay.363  The argument that a legal revision has a 
neutral economic effect can be very important in terms of 
constitutional considerations, as described below.364 
There have, however, been instances wherein patent rights 
were simply eliminated.  Often, such measures appear to have been 
provoked by a political problem rather than a legal (or economic) 
one.  Perhaps the best example is the 1996 act entitled Limitations 
on Patent Infringements Relating to a Medical Practitioner’s 
 
 361 See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 16, ch. 2, pp. 18–22 (referring to a 
general strengthening of the patent system through Congress and the courts). 
 362 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2000) (amended 2003) (note that the 2003 amendment now 
expressly grants subject matter jurisdiction to the federal courts for a declaratory 
judgment of non-infringement where the patent holder fails to bring an action within 45 
days after notice under 21 U.S.C. § 355). 
 363 35 U.S.C. §§ 155, 156 (2003); see also Mossinghoff, supra note 28, at 190. 
 364 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt.2, at 27–30 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2711–14 (considering whether the Hatch-Waxman Act would result 
in an unconstitutional taking of intellectual property and determining that it does not). 
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Performance of a Medical Activity.365  This law eliminated 
infringement liability for medical practitioners who infringe 
patents in the course of their medical activities.366  It was passed as 
part of the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill for that 
year367 with the poignant implication that medical practitioners 
were suffering under burdensome patent infringement liability.368  
The law abolished these patent rights due to a perception that such 
enforcement would be socially unacceptable369 and merely added 
to health care costs.370  After some initial protest in the patent 
community, the revision has now been accepted, or at least 
tolerated. 
The greatest obstacle the legislature faces in curtailing patent 
rights is the Fifth Amendment.371  The courts have been clear that a 
legislative act that harms or eliminates existing property rights may 
constitute a taking, triggering the Constitution’s just compensation 
requirement.372  This characterization applies even when the act 
affects only a small part of a broad property right.373  If a statute 
making such a change does not provide a means for obtaining just 
 
 365 See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 616 
(1996). 
 366 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2000). 
 367 See Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, Medical Method Patents and the Fifth Amendment: 
Do the New Limits on Enforceability Effect a Taking?, 4 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 147, 
154–57 (1996). 
 368 See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Remedies Under Patents on Medical and Surgical 
Procedures, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 789, 789–90 (1996) (reviewing the 
background behind the adoption of the limitation). 
 369 Id. 
 370 See 142 Cong. Rec. S. 12024 (1996) (statement of Sen. Frist). 
 371 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 372 See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 532–34 (1998) (“Retroactivity is generally 
disfavored in the law . . . . In Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798), this Court 
held that the Ex Post Facto Clause is directed at the retroactivity of penal legislation, 
while suggesting that the Takings Clause provides a similar safeguard against 
retrospective legislation concerning property rights.”). 
 373 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 429–30 (1982) 
(“Later cases, relying on the character of a physical occupation, clearly establish that 
permanent occupations of land by such installations as telegraph and telephone lines, 
rails, and underground pipes or wires are takings even if they occupy only relatively 
insubstantial amounts of space and do not seriously interfere with the landowner’s use of 
the rest of his land.”). 
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compensation, it is unconstitutional and will be struck down by a 
court, at least in part.374 
Faced with the constitutional impediment, Congress has two 
choices: (1) create a mechanism for paying just compensation or 
(2) draft the law so as to only apply prospectively.  The former is 
usually impractical for reasons described above, but the latter is 
commonly utilized.375  Unfortunately, in the fight to curb drug 
costs, prospective application of the law would render it useless in 
the near term. 
Prospective application of a revision to the Patent Act means 
that only patents issuing after the law takes effect would be subject 
to the reduced rights.376  Existing patent rights would remain the 
same.  This is significant because patents are usually obtained for 
products years before they traverse the complex and time 
consuming procedures for FDA marketing approval.377  Thus, a 
prospective patent right restriction would not only fail to impact 
products that are currently on the market, but new products 
arriving on the market for several years would be free of the new 
 
 374 See E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 538 (invalidating a provision of Coal Industry Retiree 
Health Benefit Act that required a former operator to fund health benefits for retired 
miners who had worked for the operator before it left the coal industry).  Theoretically, if 
a statute constitutes a taking and is unclear regarding Congress’s intent to provide 
compensation, a plaintiff must first seek compensation from the Court of Federal Claims. 
See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 11 (1990).  However, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that, in situations wherein it would be a practical impossibility for the federal 
government to compensate, it can be presumed that Congress did not intend to provide 
compensation. See E.  Enters., 524 U.S. at 520–22.  This must be the case in the context 
of an elimination of patent rights, which would require Congress to compensate for each 
incident of infringement in many separate, continuing actions; injunctive relief is the only 
realistic solution. 
 375 The Supreme Court has even noted that legislative decisions that affect property are 
presumed to be prospective unless they are specifically noted to apply retroactively. See, 
e.g., United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 (1982) (“The principle that 
statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions operate retrospectively, is 
familiar to every law student.”). 
 376 For example, the law limiting medical practitioner liability states that it applies only 
to patents issuing on applications filed after the enactment date of the statute, September 
1996.  35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(4) (2000).  This is probably a bit of overkill, as patents become 
property rights only upon issuance, not application. 
 377 See also Mossinghoff, supra note 28, at 193 (chart using data from PhRMA 
depicting a typical timeline for the development of a new drug wherein patent rights are 
obtained ten years before the drug is approved). 
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rules.  Thus, such a provision would not benefit consumers in the 
near future. 
2. Legislative Initiatives Will Not Pass Muster Unless Diluted 
to Ineffectiveness 
A legislative effort to open the borders to pharmaceutical 
importation is not merely hypothetical; at least six bills introduced 
in the 109th Congress seek to do so primarily by revising the 
FDA’s regulatory and oversight mission.378  One of the most 
interesting of these legislative initiatives is the Pharmaceutical 
Market Access and Drug Safety Act of 2005 (hereinafter 
“PMADSA”).379  The bill, sponsored by Senator Byron Dorgan 
and co-sponsored by a large, bi-partisan group of senators,380 is 
notable in that it tackles many of the most difficult issues involved 
in creating an effective importation system, going quite far in its 
impact on established property rights.  For example, the PMADSA 
would have explicitly created an international exhaustion rule that 
is specific to pharmaceuticals: 
(f) EXHAUSTION- 
(1) IN GENERAL- Section 271 of title 35, United 
States Code, is amended— 
(A) by redesignating subsections (h) and (i) as (i) 
and (j), respectively; and 
(B) by inserting after subsection (g) the following:  
(h) It shall not be an act of infringement to use, 
offer to sell, or sell within the United States or 
to import into the United States any patented 
invention under section 804 of the Federal Food, 
 
 378 See, e.g., Affordable Health Care Act, S. 16, 109th Cong.; Prescription Drug 
Affordability Act, H.R. 578, 109th Cong; Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2005, S. 
109, 109th Cong.; Safe IMPORT Act of 2005, S. 184, 109th Cong.; Pharmaceutical 
Market Access and Drug Safety Act of 2005, S. 334, 109th Cong.; Prescription Drug 
Affordability Act of 2005, H.R. 563, 109th Cong. 
 379 Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act of 2005, S. 334, 109th Cong. 
 380 See id. at 1 (listing co-sponsors such as Senators Trent Lott, Edward Kennedy and 
John McCain). 
CAHOY 4/25/2005  4:19 PM 
2005] PROPERTY BARRIERS TO PHARMACEUTICAL IMPORTATION 701 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act that was first sold 
abroad by or under authority of the owner or 
licensee of such patent.381 
In doing so, the bill implicitly recognizes the existence of a 
national exhaustion rule for all other patented inventions and that a 
change to the Patent Act is required for a pharmaceutical 
importation plan to be effective.382  The PMADSA also contains 
numerous provisions to address safety concerns and the proper role 
of the FDA in overseeing imports. 
It is significant from the perspective of constitutional 
protections for patent rights that the bill contains no statement that 
the Patent Act revision is to apply prospectively, nor does it 
suggest that rights are not harmed.383  Additionally, it does not 
provide a compensation mechanism for patent rights taken by 
eminent domain.  Thus, this provision appears to be a relatively 
clear unconstitutional legislative taking of property. 
As with many of the other bills currently pending, the 
PMADSA is a reincarnation of a bill originally introduced during 
the 108th Congress.  Interestingly, the part of the former 
PMADSA384 that received the most attention with respect to 
property rights was a section that would prohibit any attempt to 
restrict or deny supplies of drugs to registered exporters who 
import back into the United States.385  The same language exists in 
 
 381 Id. § 4(d) (emphasis added). 
 382 At least two other bills contain almost identical language: Affordable Health Care 
Act, S. 16, 109th Cong.; Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2005, S. 109, 109th Cong. 
 383 The bill does state that “[n]othing in the amendment made by [the paragraph revising 
the patent importation right] shall be construed to affect the ability of a patent owner or 
licensee to enforce their patent, subject to such amendment.” Pharmaceutical Market 
Access and Drug Safety Act of 2005, S. 334, §4(d) 109th Cong.  This obviously does not 
account for the harm to the rights taken by the amendment. 
 384 Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act of 2004, S. 2328, 108th Cong. 
 385 See Key Differences Between Kennedy-Dorgan & Gregg-Smith-Collins, available at 
http://www.appwp.org/documents/safe_import_gregg-v-dorgan.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 
2005) (This document, which appeared on Senator Judd Gregg’s Website for several 
weeks in 2004, states that S. 2328 requires drug manufacturers to sell unlimited quantities 
of their drugs to foreign retailers at whatever price that foreign country stipulates, likely 
violating both the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Patent Clause of 
Article I of the U.S. Constitution.). 
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the current bill.386  The reason for the provision was the fear that 
pharmaceutical companies would respond to an importation system 
by simply restricting the quantity of drugs that are exported to 
foreign countries to ensure an excess is not available for re-
importation.387  Arguably, it would also constitute a taking in that 
it apparently compels pharmaceutical companies to make and sell 
whatever quantities of drugs are requested by licensed exporters.388  
Such forced sales could be constitutional if initiated as a remedial 
measure to a finding of illegal activity, such as a violation of the 
antitrust laws.389  However, no such finding has been made with 
respect to international sales that would apply to the entire 
pharmaceutical industry.  Thus, it is doubtful that this provision 
also would pass constitutional muster. 
For the reasons identified above, the PMADSA will likely be 
quite controversial.  Competing bills that are less stringent (and 
more industry friendly) have been proposed,390 and are likely to be 
proposed in the future.  Unfortunately, it is doubtful that any 
compromise in approach will be both effective and constitutional.  
Anything less than a reduction of established patent rights will give 
branded pharmaceutical manufacturers the power to eliminate the 
benefits of any importation program.  If there is any last hope 
among public policy advocates that these issues can be resolved 
without engaging pharmaceutical companies in negotiation, it is 
through legal revision by the courts. 
 
 386 Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act of 2005, S. 334, § 4(a), 109th 
Cong. 
 387 See 150 Cong. Rec. S4229 (2004) (“Our legislation also includes strict rules to close 
the loopholes that drug companies may use to evade the law.”) (statement of Senator 
Kennedy). 
 388 See Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act of 2004, S. 2328, 108th 
Cong. § 27(a). 
 389 See, e.g., Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364, 373 (1975) (ordering compulsory licenses for 
patents relating to office copiers). 
 390 See, e.g., Safe IMPORT Act of 2005, S. 184, 109th Cong.  It is a reincarnation of a 
bill introduced by Senator Judd Gregg in July of 2004, the Safe IMPORT Act of 2004, S. 
2493, 108th Cong., apparently in response to Senator Dorgan’s S. 2328. 
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B. Rewriting the Rules through the Courts: An Exception to 
Constitutional Protections 
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of eminent domain law is 
that the incredibly high constitutional hurdles that exist for the 
legislature are entirely absent when legal rules are changed by the 
courts.  If a court decides to make a change to a common law rule 
that has a retroactive effect on existing property rights, no Fifth or 
Fourteenth Amendment concerns arise.391  While the Supreme 
Court has toyed with the idea that new principles of law should be 
interpreted to apply prospectively only,392 that view has been 
rejected in recent decisions.393  In light of this, it would appear that 
the Jazz Photo decision, the platform upon which so much of the 
controversy regarding importation and intellectual property rights 
rests, could be revised far more easily and with fewer implications 
than an act of Congress.394 
To overrule Jazz Photo, another case and controversy 
obviously must arise, as certiorari has long been denied in that 
case.395  Even if this were to occur, to be effective, the decision 
 
 391 The just compensation clause has never been applied to judicial decision making. See 
Daniel R. Cahoy, Changing the Rules in the Middle of the Game: How the Prospective 
Application of Judicial Decisions Related to Intellectual Property Can Promote 
Economic Efficiency, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 21 n.75 (2003) (noting this fact and the likely 
rationale). 
 392 See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 107 (1971) (“We should not indulge in 
the fiction that the law now announced has always been the law and, therefore, that those 
who did not avail themselves of it waived their rights.”) (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
U.S. 12, 26 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)). 
 393 See Harper v. Va. Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993): 
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is 
the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive 
effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of 
whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule. 
The notion that a court could avoid Harper by fashioning a remedy that essentially 
rendered it ineffective to all but prospective cases was rejected in Reynoldsville Casket 
Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 753–54 (1995). 
 394 However, a revision of Jazz Photo would have a much greater economic effect, as it 
would affect patent rights in all industries, as opposed to being restricted to the 
pharmaceutical industry as in S. 2328. 
 395 See Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 536 U.S. 950 (2002).  As noted 
previously, this assumes that the decision in Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 
394 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005), is merely a clarification of the earlier opinion. 
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must either be made by an en banc panel of the Federal Circuit396 
or appeal of a three-judge-panel decision to the Supreme Court.  
While the Federal Circuit has been willing to make decisions en 
banc from time to time, they are relatively rare events.  The 
Supreme Court, for its part, has generally allowed the Federal 
Circuit to operate on its own as the expert specialty court on patent 
law.397  The Court has been known to step in on occasions when 
the patent bar is particularly distressed about a ruling that has a 
particularly strong negative effect on patent rights.398  In the case 
of the exhaustion doctrine after Jazz Photo, however, no such 
outrage was evident (presumably because it is said to favor patent 
owners) and the case became dormant.  It could be some time 
before another exhaustion case arises in the context of a typical 
patent infringement case. 
On the other hand, if a patent provision like that in S. 334399 is 
enacted, it is possible that the issue will emerge in the course of a 
constitutional challenge to the statute by the owner of a 
pharmaceutical-related patent.  Regardless of whether the case is 
initiated in federal or state court as described above, the issue of 
the proper boundaries of the patent right could eventually be 
addressed by the Supreme Court.400  The fact that an international 
exhaustion rule exists in other countries could influence certain 
members of the Court who have voiced an interest in looking to 
 
 396 An en banc panel of the Federal Circuit is required to change the precedent set forth 
by a three-judge panel.  A subsequent three-judge-panel decision that differs is not 
binding on a subsequent panel or lower court. See Newell Cos. v. Kenny Mfg. Co. 864 
F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“This court has adopted the rule that prior decisions of a 
panel of the court are binding precedent on subsequent panels unless and until overturned 
in banc.”). 
 397 See generally Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387 (2001). 
 398 See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoki Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000), vacated and remanded, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).  Over thirty-five amicus briefs 
were filed in the appeal before the Supreme Court. See Festo, 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (No. 
00-1543). 
 399 See supra notes 379–89 and accompanying text. 
 400 In a takings case, one of the predicate issues a court must address is the scope and 
validity of the property right. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260–61 (1946) 
(determining the boundaries of air rights associated with land in the modern world). 
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approach of other nations in forming legal doctrine.401  And given 
the pharmaceutical industry’s current status in the public eye—
which appears on-par with tobacco companies—the Jazz Photo 
rule could be ripe for reversal.  However, such a decision could be 
years in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
The preceding sections detail the conflict between health policy 
and patent property rights and note the legal obstacles that exist for 
pharmaceutical importation plans which envelope acts of 
infringement.  A broad consideration of relatively novel Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment-based arguments suggests that there is no 
easy way to escape the protections accorded established property 
rights by the Constitution without creating special rules.  If the law 
is straightforwardly enforced, unauthorized importers of patented 
pharmaceuticals will face liability under the Constitution even if 
there is immunity from prosecution under the Patent Act.  This 
suggests that almost impenetrable barriers exist for importation 
initiatives.  One might ask if this is really the proper result.  From a 
philosophical standpoint, will we accept intellectual property rights 
that are so strong?  The visceral issues in the drug import context 
provide a good test of society’s convictions. 
There are of course important reasons for granting full property 
rights for the creation of desirable information—principally, to 
create an incentive to invest money and effort.402  However, lesser 
powers could be recognized for intangibles while still providing 
some incentives.  For example, if infringement of intellectual 
 
 401 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 538, 573 (2003) (looking to a decision by the 
European Court of Justice on the validity of laws prohibiting consensual homosexual 
conduct). 
 402 See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) 
(“The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation 
and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant 
advance in the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics 
of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993–95 (1997) (“In a 
private market economy, individuals will not invest in invention or creation unless the 
expected return from doing so exceeds the cost of doing so—that is, unless they can 
reasonably expect to make a profit from the endeavor.”). 
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property were determined to be wholly distinct from eminent 
domain takings of the same property, thus removing the 
constitutional remedies, a less potent property right would result.  
Such a regime would, in essence, create a second-class form of 
property for patents, trademarks, copyrights and trade secrets.  
Though permissible under the law (assuming the legal revision is 
made by courts), there could be an economic cost.  Each “stick” 
that one removes from the property bundle reduces the value of the 
whole to some extent;403 at some point, if enough sticks are 
disregarded, a few investors may be dissuaded and their 
innovations may never come to fruition.404  This is especially 
significant where the innovations in question are directly 
applicable to health and safety problems.405 
In addition to economic incentives, there are public policy 
reasons for limiting the power of the government in its interactions 
with private property in the stream of commerce.  In a market 
economy, government use of eminent domain power to control 
supply and demand in the market place would be an abuse of 
power if the government were not forced to fully compensate the 
injured party.  Commentators have recognized that this power is 
 
 403 See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (describing the 
harm when a property owner loses “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights 
that are commonly characterized as property—the right to exclude others”). 
 404 See, e.g., Sunil Kanwar & Robert Evenson, Does Intellectual Property Protection 
Spur Technological Change? 18 (June 2001) (Center Discussion Paper No. 831 
(unpublished), Economic Growth Center, Yale University) (concluding that intellectual 
property protection has a strong positive association with research and development 
investment), available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/~egcenter/research.htm.  One 
measure of the success of a patent system is the number of innovations it induces over the 
number that would have existed anyway. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L 
ACADEMIES, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 46 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 
2004) (using “high quality patents” as an assessment criteria and stating that “[p]atents on 
known or only trivially modified inventions would confer potential market power . . . 
without providing incentives for making genuine advances or disclosing such advances to 
the public”), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309089107/html. 
 405 See, e.g., Claude E. Barfield & Mark A. Groombridge, Parallel Trade in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry: Implications for Innovation, Consumer Welfare and Health 
Policy, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 185, 247–50 (1999) (asserting that 
a legal change that allows parallel importation of pharmaceuticals will have a negative 
effect on research and development). 
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purposely limited to resolving the holdout problem.406  Eminent 
domain law ensures that the public costs are not borne solely by a 
few private property owners. 
Of course, whether this private property-based model is the 
only one capable of producing the optimal amount of innovation is 
a fair question.  The model seems primed for conflict, as it 
suggests that more income is always necessary for producing more 
innovation.  Any reduction in income could result in fewer 
important treatments in the future than would otherwise be 
discovered.407  In the context of pharmaceuticals, research suggests 
that the pressures on the system are only likely to increase because 
the return on research and development investment appears to be 
decreasing.408  Other methods of encouraging innovation have 
been suggested,409 and some already run in parallel with the 
 
 406 See THOMAS J. MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW 138 (1997) (reviewing several 
theories regarding the rationale for eminent domain power and concluding that “[t]he 
justification for eminent domain, then, is the need to prevent hold-outs, which is a form 
of transaction costs”); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 58–59 
(4th ed. 1992); B. Hermalin, An Economic Analysis of Takings, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 64, 
64–86 (1995); William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the 
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 711–12 (1985).  
Theoretically, a legitimate public use of the taken property must also be shown, but 
courts have relaxed this requirement significantly. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 
U.S. 229, 240 (1984) (“There is, of course, a role for courts to play in reviewing a 
legislature’s judgment of what constitutes a public use, even when the eminent domain 
power is equated with the police power.  But the Court in Berman made clear that it is ‘an 
extremely narrow’ one. . . .”) (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)). But see 
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 782–88 (Mich. 2004) (overruling the 
decision in Poletown Neigh. Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), and 
finding that, under the Michigan Constitution, a public use must be found in the 
condemnation itself). 
 407 See PhRMA, supra note 41, at 1 (arguing that “[i]f we focus too much on cutting the 
costs of medicines, we may lose sight of their value and we may jeopardize the value of 
pharmaceuticals that could be developed in the future”). 
 408 See DiMasi et al., supra note 42, at 154 fig.1 (demonstrating that the discovery of 
new chemical entities does not appear to be increasing at the same rate as R&D 
expenditure). 
 409 See, e.g., Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging 
Innovation, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1137 (1998) (proposing a system wherein property rights for 
important innovations are purchased by the public and freely available for developmental 
research). But see Michael Abramowicz, Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 170–71 
(2003) (introducing a detailed discussion as to why such “patent prize” systems are 
inherently flawed). 
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current intellectual property system.410  Though they may not 
render the concept of intellectual property obsolete in the near 
future, such alternatives may provide a measure of relief in areas of 
great tension like health care. 
For the immediate future, it is important to note that protecting 
patent property rights and providing effective health care (or any 
other public service) are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  There 
are other methods for allocating resources that do not depend on 
rewriting property rules.  Three intelligent steps toward resolving 
the health care crisis in this manner include: (1) using the 
negotiating power of government entities and large private 
purchasers (such as insurers) to extract lower prices; (2) 
undertaking and reporting rational assessments of the effectiveness 
of new medicines to enable purchasers to decide which new, 
patented products are worth high prices; and (3) providing the 
public with an honest assessment of the trade-offs that must be 
made when the best health care is limited by economic realities.  In 
view of the barriers to pharmaceutical importation composed of 
patent fences supported by durable constitutional fence posts, 
elected officials would be wise to consider the alternatives before 
setting out on a journey that is likely to end in public 
disenchantment. 
 
 
 410 See, e.g., David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open Source Software, 2001 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 241, 287–88 (2001) (describing the interaction between the tenets of the open 
source software movement and copyright intellectual property law). 
